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Abstract 
 If workers self-select into sectors based upon their relative productivity in different tasks, 
and comparative advantage is aligned with absolute advantage, then as a sector's employment 
share increases (decreases) the average efficacy of its workforce will fall (rise).  This provides a 
potential explanation for the differential in the measured productivity growth of contracting 
goods and expanding services.  Using changes in defense expenditures as an exogenous shifter of 
employment shares, I estimate that the elasticity of worker efficacy with respect to employment 
shares is substantially negative.  While conventional estimates indicate that productivity growth 
in goods is .8% and 1.4% faster than in services in the US and the OECD, respectively, 
regression point estimates suggest that the true difference might lie between a .5 percent 
advantage for goods and a .4 percent advantage for services.  Taking the middle of this range, the 
view that goods and services have similar productivity growth rates provides a plausible 
alternative characterization of growth in developed economies. 
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I.  Introduction 
 One of the strongest and seemingly most accurate characterizations of the process and 
problems of growth in advanced economies is William Baumol's "Cost Disease of Services."  
Baumol's argument, begun in papers as early as 1965 and continuing to this very day (e.g. 
Baumol 1965, 1967, 1985 and 2012), starts from the premise that productivity growth is 
inherently more difficult to achieve in the production of services than in the production of goods.  
With the two industries competing for factors of production in the same factor markets, the 
relative cost of producing service output inevitably rises.  If the demand for services were income 
inelastic and price elastic, these trends would not pose a problem, as the share of services in 
nominal GDP would decline.  Alas, precisely the opposite is true, and services garner an 
increasing share of nominal output.  Aggregate productivity growth, equal to the nominal output 
share weighted average of sectoral productivity growths, must steadily decline.1 
 Decades of data on productivity growth in goods and services have confirmed Baumol's 
thesis turning it, for all intents and purposes, into a stylized fact of economic growth.  
Productivity statistics, however, are based on the fundamental assumption that each new worker 
is qualitatively the same as every old worker.2  If workers self-select into industries based upon 
unobservables, this assumption may create a systematic bias, as the type of workers present when 
an industry is small may not be the same as when the industry becomes large, and vice versa. 
  In his "Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings", Roy (1951) identified the mechanism 
central to this paper.  Workers select the industry in which they have the highest relative 
                                                 
1Although not mentioned in the papers cited above, implicit in Baumol’s argument is the notion that service 
output is relatively non-tradeable.  Otherwise, low productivity growth in services could be met, at least at the 
individual country level, by exporting more manufactures for services.  
2To be sure, more sophisticated analyses divide workers into categories based upon observable determinants 
of human capital such as age and education, but within each category the assumption is ultimately made that all 
workers are identical.   
 3 
productivity, i.e. a comparative advantage.  If individual productivity in different tasks is 
uncorrelated or at worst weakly correlated, then individuals having a comparative advantage in 
an industry will on average also have an absolute advantage in that sector.  As a sector expands 
by offering higher wages to prospective workers elsewhere in the economy, it will draw in 
individuals with both a lower comparative advantage and a lower absolute advantage in the 
sector, while leaving individuals with the highest comparative and absolute advantage in 
competing sectors.  Consequently, productivity in expanding sectors will appear to decline and 
productivity in contracting sectors will appear to rise.  In sum, in a Roy world the apparent 
disparity in the productivity growth of goods and services may come about because services 
expand by drawing in people who are, as examples, less adept at finance, law and medicine, 
while goods sectors contract by shedding the least able farmers, manufacturers and miners, all of 
which is not taken into account in measures of productivity growth.  Underlying true levels of 
productivity growth, i.e. taking into account the average efficacy of the workers present in the 
two sectors, might not be all that different. 
 Figure I, which graphs the relative supply and demand for services, summarizes the 
argument made in this paper.  Baumol's supply curve is essentially a horizontal line, determined 
by the relative productivity of the two sectors.3  As goods experience more rapid productivity 
growth, this supply curve shifts up, from S0Baumol to S1Baumol, exemplifying the cost disease of 
services.  At the same time, as a consequence of the relatively higher income elasticity of demand 
for services, the relative demand curve shifts out from D0 to D1.  The equilibrium moves from E0 
to E1, with a higher relative output and price of services, which consequently has a growing
                                                 
3If the capital income shares (i.e. factor intensities) of the two sectors differ, the supply curve will be 
upward sloping even without the effects Roy describes.  However, as discussed in Appendix A, empirically the 
capital income shares of goods and services in the US economy are almost identical and the upward slope in the 
supply curve attributable to this effect is negligible, i.e. an increase in relative prices of .4 of one percent as relative 
output goes from 0 to ∞.  In the sources cited above Baumol and his co-authors never emphasize a relative price 
effect emanating from relative factor intensities and, in this regard, appear to be completely correct. 
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Figure I:  Alternative Views of Relative Supply
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nominal share of the economy.  An alternative hypothesis, however, is that the supply curve is 
substantially upward sloping because of the correlation between comparative and absolute 
advantage Roy describes.  As drawn in the figure, the Roy supply curve SRoy intersects both E0 
and E1.  This describes a situation in which productivity growth is the same in both sectors, so the 
supply curve does not shift, but the relative demand curve shifts out as incomes rise.   Here the 
rise in the relative price of services is driven purely by the changing efficacy of the average 
worker in each sector.4 
 Figure I makes clear that the Roy model does not deny the rise in the relative price of 
services, it merely explains it with a different mechanism.  Figure II illustrates why this matters.    
Panel (a) draws the linear production possibilities frontier implied by the Baumol model, which 
rotates out as goods experience more rapid productivity growth.5  Panel (b) draws the Roy 
production possibilities frontier, which shifts out uniformly when productivity growth is identical 
in both sectors.  This panel shows that the same equilibrium price and quantity relations can be 
explained with equiproportional shifts of the intercepts of the production possibility frontier and a 
movement along its concave surface.  For the purposes of heuristically illustrating welfare 
implications, the diagrams also include social indifference curves which, under the assumption of 
competitive markets, are tangent to the production possibilities frontiers.  Aggregate total factor 
productivity growth is the proportional increase in the length of the ray from the origin to the 
tangent line on the production frontier (∆V/V in the figure).6  In the Baumol model, as the share 
                                                 
4As Figure I makes clear, for Baumol’s argument it does not matter whether or not the relative real output of 
services is rising (only that its nominal share is increasing), but for the Roy argument it does.  Baumol et al (1985) 
argue that there is no change in the relative output of goods and services.  This is actually not true.  As discussed in 
Section III, US and OECD data clearly indicate a large rise in the relative real output of services in the post-war era. 
5For the purposes of this expositional diagram, I assume that factor supplies are constant. 
6To see this, note that if inputs are constant (as assumed in the diagram), we can describe the problem of 
maximizing GDP as one of maximizing PxX + PYY s.t. 0 > F(X,Y,t).  Differentiating the binding production 
possibilities constraint, we have (a) FXdX + FYdY + Ftdt = 0.  Rearranging and making use of the first order 
conditions from the maximization problem (λFX=PX, etc), one finds that: 
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of services in total expenditure grows, the growth rate of this vector slows.  In the Roy model, the 
proportional growth rate remains constant.  Over time there is a growing discrepancy in the 
instantaneous rate of welfare growth predicted by the two models. 
 This paper draws its inspiration from recent interest in the macro implications of Roy’s 
model.  Lagakos and Waugh (2011) argue that selection effects of the type described in this paper 
can explain the greater relative productivity of agricultural workers to non-agricultural workers in 
countries with larger non-agricultural sectors.  Hsieh, Hurst, Jones and Klenow (2012) calculate 
the inefficiency associated with the historical concentration of women and African-Americans in 
particular occupations using a Roy model and argue that the gradual elimination of barriers to the 
participation of these groups in other occupations can explain as much as 1/5th of post-war US 
aggregate wage growth.  Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013), independent of the early draft of this 
paper, argue that the decrease of manufacturing output brought about by the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate associated with resource windfalls generates a spurious rise in manufacturing 
productivity as the contraction of the sector leaves only the most productive workers behind.  
This paper extends these Roy-related analyses to the general consideration of the relative 
productivity of goods and services.  Along the way, I establish the theoretical bias in 
conventional measures of sectoral and aggregate productivity and clarify the mathematical 
conditions necessary for Roy effects to be present (i.e. for average worker efficacy to be 
declining in a sector’s employment share).  While the papers above calibrate their models, this 
paper estimates the size of Roy effects using regression techniques. 
                                                                                                                                                              
YYxXtTFP ggGDPFg θθλ +=−= /  
where λ is the value of relaxing the PPF constraint, Өi the GDP share of product i, and gi the growth of the output of 
i.  Thus, total factor productivity growth, the proportionate value of the time trend relaxation of the PPF constraint, 
equals the GDP share weighted increase of the output of each product.  (a) above, however, holds whether the dX & 
dY are the observed values or imposed values such that dX = g*X & dY = g*Y.  Thus, regardless of the bias of TFP 
growth, one can equally say that gTFP = ӨXg + ӨYg = g.  g is the proportionate increase in the length of the vector 
(with slope determined by the current production bundle) from the origin to the production possibilities frontier. 
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 With regards to empirically estimating the elasticity of average worker efficacy with 
respect to the sectoral employment share, the key parameter in the macro implementation of the 
Roy model, there has been little prior research.  A partial exception is provided by McLaughlin 
and Bils (2001), who use PSID data to show that the wages of entrants or leavers are lower than 
those of continuing workers.  However, as shown further below, the PSID data used in that paper 
mostly concern simultaneous entry and exit (a form of employment churning) and are 
uncorrelated with changes in sectoral employment shares.  This paper focuses directly on the 
impact of changes in sectoral employment, using private sector employment changes driven by 
changes in military spending to identify the elasticity of average worker efficacy with respect to 
sectoral employment. 
 Zvi Griliches, in his presidential address (1994) and earlier (1992), brought to the 
profession’s attention the shortcomings of US measures of service sector output, such as those 
which extrapolated inputs, eliminating productivity growth by construction.  Since his time, 
however, there have been vast improvements in the national income accounts measures of service 
sector activity, particularly in regards to the recent time period (1987-2010) which is the focus of 
this paper’s analysis.  Triplett and Bosworth (2004) provide a review of these developments and 
the problems which remain.  This paper takes as given the official measures of sectoral output, 
focusing on the systematic bias brought about by the failure to consider the relation between 
employment shares and average worker efficacy. 
 The paper proceeds as follows:  I begin in Section II by presenting a simple Roy model, 
showing how the bias in sectoral measures of total factor productivity growth and the slope of the 
relative supply curve depend upon a key parameter:  the elasticity of average worker efficacy 
within a sector with respect to that sector’s share of total employment.  Section II also shows how 
correlation between an individual's productivity in different activities can eliminate the positive 
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association between comparative advantage and absolute advantage, overturning Roy’s 
prediction that average worker efficacy is inversely related to a sector's employment share.  Thus, 
the relation between worker efficacy and sectoral employment depends upon the process 
generating individual productivity draws, i.e. it is ultimately something that needs to be estimated 
empirically rather than identified theoretically. 
Section III presents industry level evidence that the elasticity of worker efficacy with 
respect to sectoral employment is, indeed, substantially negative.  Projecting the Bureau of 
Labour Statistics KLEMS7 measures for the United States private sector divided into 60 sectors, 
and the University of Groningen’s KLEMS measures for private sector activity in 18 OECD 
countries divided into 29 sectors, on a variety of instruments, I find that defense spending is the 
only instrument that robustly satisfies the dual requirements of 1st stage significance and 2nd stage 
exogeneity (the exclusion restriction) necessary for two stage least squares (2SLS).  Estimates of 
the long run elasticity of worker efficacy with respect to the sectoral employment share range 
from -.5 to -1, with most observations concentrated in the more negative half of this range.  I also 
find that an elasticity of -.75 equalizes goods and services productivity growth in the US and the 
OECD at large.  It produces a stable Roy supply curve which matches the historical US and 
OECD data on relative goods and services price and quantity growth, as heuristically illustrated 
in Figure I above.  
 Section V concludes the body of the paper.  Appendix A provides mathematical proofs of 
all of the claims made in Section II.  While the BLS adjusts its aggregate economy-wide 
measures of labour input growth for compositional effects, it does not do this in the sectoral 
KLEMS data base.  Appendix B describes how I develop detailed sectoral measures of labour 
composition which I use to adjust the BLS measures of total factor productivity growth and the 
                                                 
7Capital (K), labor (L), energy (E), materials (M) and purchased service inputs (S). 
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sectoral measures of changing employment shares.  Finally, Appendix C provides a review of the 
PSID data used in the McLaughlin and Bils paper mentioned above, showing that it concerns 
simultaneous entry and exit, rather than the overall expansion and contraction of sectoral 
employment, which is the focus of Roy’s model and this paper. 
 
II.  Structural Transformation and the Mismeasurement of Productivity  
 In this section I present the main theoretical results of the paper.  Throughout the analysis 
I focus on supply relations alone, leaving the general equilibrium closure of the model with 
preferences and demand unspecified.   This is both because I do not want to take a stand on the 
nature of preferences and demand (including trade), and because it is unnecessary to do so.  All 
of the implications of the Roy model can be understood in terms of the supply curve and all of 
the theoretical analysis can be understood in terms of movements along that curve, movements 
whose causes, while obviously related to demand, do not need to be specified.  To focus on 
intuition, I confine the mathematical proofs of the claims made in this section to Appendix A. 
 (a) A Simple Model 
Consider an economy with two perfectly competitive industries, goods (G) and services 
(S).  Value added in industry i (= G or S) is produced with capital and labour: 








= ∫
∈ iSetu
iiiii uzKFAQ )(,)1(  
where Seti is the set of workers u labouring in industry i and zi(u) is the efficacy or productivity of 
individual u when working in industry i.  Each worker is endowed with a pair of industry 
productivities (zG, zS) which is drawn from some joint cumulative distribution function G(zG, zS).   
 Workers move to the industry providing the highest financial reward.  Thus, with wi  
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denoting the wage per unit of effective labour offered in industry i, the set of individuals 
choosing to work in that sector is given by: 
{ })()(|)2( uzwuzwuSet jjiii >=  
where j is the sectoral complement of i.  Define πi as the probability a worker selects industry i 
or, equivalently, the share of the labour force in industry i.  With L denoting the total labour 
force, Li, the number of workers in industry i, equals πiL.  For a given distribution of (zG, zS) 
draws, πi is determined in a general equilibrium that includes a specification of demand, with 
dπi/dω > 0, where ω = wi/wj. 
   Define the expected efficacy of a worker in sector i, i.e. their productivity conditional on 
working in that sector, as  
( )
i
Setu
i
Setu
Setu
i
iii L
uzuz
SetuuzEz i
i
i
pi*
du)(
du
du)(
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∫
∫
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As proven in Appendix A, regardless of the distribution function generating the paired draws   
(zG, zS) , the elasticity of expected worker efficacy with respect to the sectoral employment share 
is greater than -1: 
1)4( −>=
i
i
i
i
zd
zd pi
pi
ξ
 
From (3), we see that if we ignore the numerator the elasticity of iz with respect to πi is -1.  The 
numerator, however, is increasing in πi, as anything that increases the total number of workers 
will increase the cumulative sum of their productivities.  Consequently, the overall elasticity of 
iz with respect to πi will be greater than -1 (examples for particular functional forms are provided 
in Appendix A).  None of the empirical estimates presented later in Section III rejects this 
prediction.  While ξ may be positive or negative, Roy (1951), as explained in the Introduction, 
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argued that it should be negative, i.e. average worker efficacy declines as a sector expands and 
draws in less productive workers.  For the moment, I will assume this to be true. 
Aggregate labour input in an industry is a product of the number of workers times the 
average efficacy per worker, so the production function is usefully reexpressed as: 
( )iiiiii zLKFAQ ,)5( =  
From this, we see that total factor productivity growth, properly calculated, is given by8 
)ˆˆ(ˆˆ)(ˆ)6( iiLiiKiii zLKQtrueA +Θ−Θ−=  
where a ^ denotes a proportional change and ΘKi and ΘLi are the factor income shares of capital 
and labour in sector i, respectively.  Unfortunately, in estimating total factor productivity growth 
growth accountants treat each new worker as the equivalent of existing workers,9 estimating total 
factor productivity growth to be 
 iLiiiLiiiLiiKiii trueAztrueALKQestA piξ ˆ)(ˆˆ)(ˆˆˆˆ)(ˆ)7( Θ+=Θ+=Θ−Θ−=  
If average worker efficacy depends inversely on a sector’s share of the labour force (ξ < 0), 
growth accountants will systematically overestimate productivity growth in sectors whose labour 
share is contracting, such as goods industries, and systematically underestimate it in sectors 
whose labour share is expanding, such as services. 
 In a world in which heterogeneous workers choose their occupation based upon their 
unobserved productivity in different tasks there may also be biases in conventional measures of 
aggregate economy-wide total factor productivity growth.  Aggregate productivity growth equals  
                                                 
8The derivation is the usual one for total factor productivity calculations.  With perfect competition the 
capital rental and wage per unit of effective labour equal the value marginal product of each factor, so the elasticity 
of the production function with respect to each factor equals the factor income share. 
9A more refined practice is to differentiate workers into types based upon observable characteristics such as 
age and education.  Within each type, however, marginal workers are treated as identical to average workers, 
producing the same problem, as I show when I extend the model further below. 
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the sum of sectoral productivity growths weighted by their shares of aggregate value added: 
    ∑∑ ==ΩΩ=
i
ii
ii
i
i
ii QPGDPGDP
QPtrueAtrueA    and         where)(ˆ)(ˆ)8(
 
As proven in Appendix A, regardless of the characteristics of the joint distribution from which 
the paired individual productivities (zG, zS) are drawn or the elasticity of average worker efficacy 
with respect to the employment share (ξ), the growth accountant's estimate of aggregate 
productivity is related to actual productivity growth by the formula10 
 ∑∑∑ ΘΩ+=+=Ω=
i
iLii
i
iii
i
ii trueAdzWGDP
L
trueAestAestA pipi ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ)9(
 
where dπi is the change in sector i's share of total employment and iii zwW = equals the average 
earnings of a worker in sector i.   
 While the last equality in (9) expresses the bias in terms of the traditional proportional 
changes of growth accounting, the next to last equality, with its emphasis on average earnings, is 
more illuminating.  Within the standard growth accounting framework, which treats all workers 
within a sector as identical, any difference in average sectoral wages is an indication of 
inefficiency, an inequality in the value marginal product of labour.  Consequently, growth 
accountants implicitly treat the movement of workers from sectors with low average wages to 
those with high average wages as an improvement in aggregate efficiency, a "gain from 
reallocation".  In a Roy model the marginal worker u finds that his value marginal product is 
equalized across sectors, wizi(u) = wjzj(u), but there is nothing forcing the average value marginal 
product of workers in a sector ( iii zwW = ) to be equalized across industries.  Average marginal 
products reflect characteristics of the infra-marginal distribution of heterogenous talent within 
                                                 
10From (7) and (8) one can see that the aggregate bias involves some weighted sum of changes in sectoral 
average worker efficacies.  The proof in the appendix shows how these can be transformed into a wage weighted 
sum of changes in employment shares. 
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industries.  They may equalize across sectors, as happens to be the case when the zi are draws 
from fréchet distributions, or they may not, as is the case for draws from exponential distributions 
(see Appendix A), but gaps in these average products neither reflect the degree of inefficiency 
nor potential gains from reallocation.  As it so happens, in US and OECD data of the past few 
decades the average wages of goods and service workers are quite similar (see Section III), so I 
find little aggregate bias in estimates of total factor productivity growth for these countries, but 
these issues could be quite relevant in the study of productivity growth and structural change in 
developing countries where, for example, there are often large differences between agricultural 
and non-agricultural wages. 
 Finally, I turn to the derivation of the shape of the relative supply curve.  I make two 
empirical assumptions which, although not universal characteristics of the model, approximately 
characterize the US and OECD economies (see end of Section III below): (1) average wages per 
worker are proportional across sectors; and (2) factor income shares are the same in the two 
sectors.  Mathematically, these amount to: 
SSGGGSSG
SS
S
GG
G
SSSGGG
LKLKzzww
LW
rK
LW
rKWzwzwW
ˆˆˆˆ
   and   ˆˆˆˆ   so
   and   )10(
−=−−=−
==∝=
 
where r is the common rental per unit of capital.  As ),( iiiiii zLKFAQ =  and ii LL pi= , we have 
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From the dual measure of total factor productivity growth iiLKi PwrA ˆˆˆˆ −Θ+Θ= ,
11
 so 
 )ˆˆ()ˆˆ()ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆˆ)12( SGSGLSGGSLGS AAzzAAwwPP −+−Θ=−+−Θ=−  
                                                 
11Totally differentiating iiiiii zLwrKQP += : )ˆˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆˆ iiiLiKii zLwKrQP ++Θ++Θ=+ . Substituting for 
iQˆ  gives the equation in the text. 
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Finally, substituting for SG zz ˆˆ −  using (11), we derive the shape of the Roy supply curve: 
( ) ( ) [ ]Royˆˆ
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The first term on the right-hand side of (13) gives the slope of the supply curve; the 
second term gives the vertical shift associated with a change in relative total factor productivities.  
For 0 > ξ > -1, the supply curve is upward sloping, as drawn in Figure I of the Introduction.  In 
the special case where ξ = 0 and average worker productivity does not vary with the sectoral 
employment share, labour is, for all intents and purposes, homogenous and the supply curve 
reduces to: 
 [ ]Baumolˆˆˆˆ)14( SGGS AAPP −=−  
With PS /PG independent of QS /QG, this is, of course, Baumol's horizontal relative supply curve. 
Equation (13) highlights the fact that, in the absence of differences in productivity growth 
rates, there is a limit to the relative price growth that can be explained by Roy’s model of self 
selection.  With the labour share of 2/3 observed in the US and OECD economies, as ξ goes from 
0 to -1 the slope parameter -ΘLξ/(1-ΘLξ) goes from 0 to 2.  Thus, the Roy supply curve can be no 
steeper than 2, i.e. the historical growth of the relative output of services to goods has to be at 
least ½ the historical growth of the relative price if one wants to eliminate Baumol type effects 
from the story.  As it so happens, the historical growth rates of relative goods and services 
outputs and prices in the US and the OECD at large appear to be about equal (see Section III), 
which can be explained, in the absence of any differences in productivity growth, with a ξ of -.75.  
This value is comfortably within the range of long run estimates using defense spending as an 
instrument reported later in Section III. 
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(b) Comparative and Absolute Advantage and the Sign of ξ 
In Appendix A I prove that sufficient conditions for ξ, the elasticity of average worker 
efficacy with respect to a sector’s share of total employment, to be less than zero are that (a) the 
sectoral productivity draws zi are independent of each other; and (b) the elasticity of the 
cumulative distribution function for each of the draws, (dG/dz)*(z/G), is decreasing in the 
productivity of the draw.  The latter characteristic is true of all of the popular distribution 
functions defined on non-negative numbers, i.e. the chi-squared, exponential, F, fréchet, gamma, 
lognormal, pareto, rayleigh, uniform and weibull distributions,12 so I relegate a discussion of its 
role to the appendix.  The assumption of independence is more problematic, so I explore its role  
here with a simple example and diagram. 
Consider a two sector example where the draw for sector i is deterministically related to 
that of sector j by the equation zi = zjη, with zj drawn from any distribution function.  Workers 
will select sector i if wi zi > wj zj or, equivalently, wi /wj > zj1-η.  Figure III illustrates how the 
characteristics of the resulting equilibrium vary with η.   Panel (a) considers the case where η<0, 
i.e. the productivity draws are negatively correlated.  The upper quadrant of the diagram shows 
that there exists a marginal draw zj* such that all workers with draws greater than zj* work in 
sector j and all workers with draws less than zj* work in sector i.  The productivity of workers in 
sector i is illustrated in the lower quadrant, where the axis, despite its location below the 
horizontal line, should be read as representing positive numbers.  With η<0, the productivity of 
workers in sector i is negatively related to the zj draws.  jz  is given by the average of the workers 
to the right of zj*, while iz  is given by the average of the workers below (i.e. south of) zi* = zj*η.   
                                                 
12While this condition may be true for all of the well known distributions, I should note that it isn't hard to 
think of distribution functions where it is not.  Thus, the distribution function G(z) = (exp(z)-1)/(exp(1)-1) defined on 
[0,1] violates the condition and, in a simple two sector example, produces regions where the average productivity of 
workers in a sector is rising in the sector’s share of total employment.  I should also note that for the uniform 
distribution defined on [a,b], for a > 0 the elasticity of the cumulative distribution is strictly decreasing in z but for    
a = 0 it is constant and a weaker form of the theorem applies (ξ is non-positive). 
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As wi /wj increases, sector j sheds workers with less than the average productivity in that industry, 
while sector i gains workers with less than the average productivity in that sector.  Average 
productivity rises in the sector losing workers and falls in the sector gaining workers, so ξ  <  0. 
Turning to panel (b) of the figure, we consider the case where the draws are positively 
correlated, so 1 > η > 0.13  With a positive relationship between zi and zj, jz  is once again given 
by the average of the workers to the right of zj*, but iz  now equals the average of the workers 
above zi*.  As wi /wj rises, industry j sheds workers with less than the average productivity in that 
sector, but industry i gains workers with more than its average sectoral productivity.  ξ is still 
negative for sector j, but it is now positive for sector i. 
Returning to the trade terminology used in the Introduction of this paper, if there is a 
positive correlation between comparative advantage and absolute advantage, then marginal 
workers entering or exiting an industry will have less than the average sectoral productivity.  If, 
however, the correlation between comparative and absolute advantage is negative, marginal 
workers will have more than the average productivity.  In panel (a) of Figure III, workers who 
                                                 
13For the case η > 1, rearrange zi = zjη as zj = zi1/η, rename i as j and j as i and proceed with diagram (b). 
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choose to work in industry i or j (a consequence of comparative advantage) are absolutely more 
productive in that sector than workers who choose to work in the other sector, so comparative 
advantage is positively correlated with absolute advantage.  In panel (b), this is true for sector j, 
but it is no longer true for sector i.  In the case of sector i, workers who choose to work in the 
industry (those with zi lying north of zi* on the vertical axis) are absolutely less productive in that 
sector than those who choose to work elsewhere (those with zi lying south of zi* on the vertical 
axis), so comparative advantage is negatively correlated with absolute advantage. 
Roy argued that if a worker’s productivities in different sectors are independent of each 
other, then the marginal worker entering or exiting an industry will be less efficient than the 
average worker in that sector.  The theorem described above and proven in Appendix A shows 
that, modulo a technical density condition, Roy’s conjecture is true.  Figure III shows that 
positive correlation between an individual’s productivity in different sectors undermines the 
association between comparative and absolute advantage, producing an indeterminate association 
between average and marginal productivities.  In constructing total factor productivity growth 
estimates, as discussed shortly below, the growth accountant typically adjusts for observables 
such as age and education that create positive correlations in individual productivity across 
industries and tasks.  These adjustments are, however, by no means exhaustive and it remains an 
empirical question whether or not comparative advantage is positively or negatively correlated 
with absolute advantage.  The empirical results of the next section, interpreted in the light of the 
Roy model, provide some evidence in favour of the view that the elasticity of average worker 
efficacy with respect to a sector’s employment share is negative, i.e. that by and large 
comparative and absolute advantage are indeed positively correlated. 
(c) Practical Extensions 
A modest amount of notational and algebraic complexity must be added to the model to  
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bring it to the data.  To this end, imagine that there are N sectors with gross output in each sector 
i a function of J types of labour input and M types of other inputs: 
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where I now use superscripts to denote the type of input and subscripts the industry.  The switch 
from value added to gross output reflects the fact that my data sources, the BLS and Groningen 
KLEMS, measure total factor productivity growth at the sectoral level, using the gross output 
concept, so the list of M additional inputs moves beyond capital and includes intermediate inputs 
such as materials, services and energy.  Good estimates of total factor productivity growth 
typically adjust for "labour quality" by decomposing labour into mutually exclusive categories 
based upon observable determinants of human capital such as sex, age and education.  This 
decomposition not only produces more accurate measures of total factor productivity growth, it 
also implicitly controls for factors that produce a positive correlation in individual productivity 
across tasks, as noted above.   
While the Groningen KLEMS adjust for labour quality, the BLS KLEMS measures do not 
adjust for labour quality, using only total labour hours as the measure of labour input.  Using 
Current Population Survey data, I have constructed measures of labour input for each of the 60 
KLEMS sectors cross-classified by sex, age (6 categories) and education (5 categories).  I follow 
a methodology very similar to that used by the BLS in producing its measures of labour quality 
for the aggregate economy, using the CPS data to determine the distribution of workers by 
characteristic, but benchmarking the sectoral totals of hours and workers using the BLS Current 
Employment Statistics data.  Details are provided in Appendix B.  I use these estimates to adjust 
the BLS TFP growth measures for the changing composition of the workforce and to calculate 
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the changing shares of workers by characteristic, as in (17) below.  The main results, however, 
can just as easily be found with the unadjusted BLS data, as reported in footnotes later. 
 To extend the model to this environment, let each worker of type j be endowed with a set 
of N industry productivities ),...,,( 21 jNjj zzz  drawn from some joint distribution function and let 
j
iw denote the wage per unit of effective labour of type j in industry i.  A worker chooses to work 
in sector i if ikuzwuzw jk
j
k
j
i
j
i ≠∀> )()( .  Total factor productivity growth in each sector is 
given by 
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where jiL is the number of workers of type j employed in sector i, jiz is their average efficacy, and 
the jLiΘ and 
m
MiΘ  represent the factor income shares of workers of type j and other inputs of type 
m in sector i, respectively.  Conventional measures of total factor productivity growth, by 
ignoring changes in the average efficacy of workers, have a bias equal to: 
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Growth accounting calculations intrinsically assume that all workers of a given type are the same.  
Unless the list of observable worker characteristics completely exhausts the determinants of 
individual productivity, the productivity of the marginal worker entering or exiting an industry 
will generally be different than that of the sectoral average for that type of worker.  If the 
elasticity of average worker efficacy with respect to the employment share is negative (ξ <0),14 
conventional growth accounting will under or overstate productivity growth in sectors with  
                                                 
14(17) assumes that ξ is the same for all sectors and types at all times.  This is precisely true for some 
distribution functions (e.g. independent draws from Fréchet distributions with the same dispersion parameter).  
Otherwise, one must take ξ as an average of the differing elasticities. 
 20 
expanding or contracting employment shares, respectively. 
 Finally, I note that for productivity measures based upon gross output the appropriate 
measure of economy-wide productivity growth and the bias in conventional estimates are once 
again given by equations (8) and (9) earlier, except that, with Qi now denoting gross-output rather 
than value added, the sectoral weights Ωi = PiQi/GDP are the "Domar weights" (Domar 1961, 
Hulten 1978) and sum to more than one in aggregate.  Because sectoral output is also used as an 
input in other industries, rather than simply a component of final demand, each sector's 
productivity growth has a multiplied effect on aggregate productivity.  We can define aggregates 
for goods and services, separately, by using the GDP originating in each sector as the 
denominator: 
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and where I(j) is the set of industries in sector j = G or S and, as shown, aggregate productivity 
growth is the GDP share weighted average of goods and services productivity growth.  I use this 
formula in my calculation of total goods and services productivity growth in Section III.15 
 
III.  Industry Evidence on the Elasticity of Worker Efficacy with Respect to 
Employment Shares 
 (a) Empirical Specification 
 I use the following two stage least squares specification to explore the bias in sectoral 
measures of total factor productivity growth brought about by changing labour allocations: 
                                                 
15Since TFP growth measured using the value added approach equals the ratio of sectoral gross output to 
sectoral value added times TFP growth measured using the gross output approach, (18) transforms the gross output 
TFP measures into a value added share weighted sum of sectoral value added TFP measures.  For the aggregate 
economy, Domar's method aggregates sectoral gross output TFP measures into the implied aggregate value added 
TFP measure.  (18) is a simple extension of his method to allow the calculation of sub-total value added measures. 
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where ictYˆ  is total factor productivity growth in industry i of country c in period t, the αic are 
industry x country dummies capturing mean productivity growth by sector and the δct are country 
x year dummies capturing economy-wide fluctuations in average productivity growth.  There is a 
well known association between the business cycle and measured productivity growth, driven 
perhaps by mismeasurement due to changes in capacity utilization and the role real technology 
shocks play in producing the business cycle.  While the country x year dummies account for 
mean economy-wide changes, the ln change in the national unemployment rate
ctUˆ , entered 
separately by industry x country (γic is an industry x country effect), corrects for the cyclical 
variation in relative industry productivity growth that might otherwise appear as correlation with 
other variables.  Finally, ictXˆ  equals the labour income share weighted sum of the change in 
national employment shares by worker type, as shown in the right-hand side of (17) earlier. The 
coefficient ξ, by the theory described earlier above, is the elasticity of worker efficacy with 
respect to employment shares, the principal object of interest in the regression.16 
 The OLS relation between productivity and employment shares potentially has both 
exogenous and endogenous components.  On the one hand, movements in relative industry 
demand, due to the growth of aggregate income and non-homothetic preferences, will lead to 
exogenous changes in relative employment shares.  On the other hand, the response of relative 
demand to relative price movements brought about by productivity growth may lead to an 
endogenous response of employment shares to productivity growth.  There are special cases 
where these effects disappear, such as with homothetic utility and unitary income elasticities of 
                                                 
16This specification estimates a single ξ, but it is compatible with a world in which ξ varies, say, by industry 
(ξi).  As long as the variation is independent of the right hand side variables, there is no bias and the estimated value 
of ξ can be interpreted as the mean value of the ξi   Estimating ξ by industry is not sensible, as the resulting sample 
sizes are tiny (e.g. 20+ observations per industry in the US), while the properties of 2SLS rely on asymptotics. 
 22 
demand (no exogenous variation of relative demand) or with Hicks-Neutral technical change and 
unitary price elasticities of demand (no endogenous variation of factor allocations with sectoral 
productivity growth), but it seems reasonable to allow for the existence of both in the data.17  As 
shown in the second line of (19), to correct for potential endogeneity I run a first stage regression 
in which the labour income weighted changes in sectoral employment shares are regressed on the 
exogenous variables of the total factor productivity equation plus an excluded instrument.  The 
relation of the excluded instrument with ictXˆ  is allowed to vary across industries and countries 
(βic varies by industry x country).  Variation by industry is necessary, as for an instrument to 
influence employment shares it must raise employment in some industries at the expense of 
others, and variation by countries allows for differences in the composition of otherwise 
nominally “identical” sectoral aggregates.  Because the instrument is interacted by industry x 
country, i.e. appears multiple times in the regression, it is possible to perform a valid 
overidentification test of the exclusion restriction, even though only “one” instrument appears in 
the regression.18 
 I draw on two datasets which provide comprehensive measures of private sector total 
factor productivity broken down by sector ( ictYˆ above).  First, I use data on total factor 
productivity growth by sector drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ KLEMS (capital, 
labour, energy, materials and business services) database, which provides estimates of US private 
                                                 
17Ngai-Pissarides (2007) provide an analysis of the case with homothetic utility, Hicks-Neutral technical 
change and inelastic demand, where all of the relation between labour allocations and productivity is endogenous.  
Homothetic utility, however, provides a poor characterization of demand, as it implies that relative quantities fall 
with relative prices whereas, as discussed below, the overwhelming trend in the OECD is for relative quantity to rise 
with relative price (reflecting non-unitary income elasticities).  Hicks-Neutral technical change misses interesting 
interactions between factor biased technical change and the elasticity of substitution.  For example, Bustos, 
Caprettini & Ponticelli (2013) show that despite an infinite elasticity of demand (free trade), labour augmenting 
technical change in the presence of a low elasticity of factor substitution can actually lead to a reduction in sectoral 
employment. 
18Lest the reader think there is an error here, I confirm the exactness of the overidentification test using 
simulated data that satisfy the exclusion restriction, as discussed further below. 
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sector productivity growth disaggregated into 60 comprehensive industries from 1987 to 2010.  
As noted earlier, these data do not adjust for the changing composition of the labour force, so I 
use Current Population Survey data to develop industry level measures of the distribution of 
workers by sex x age x education and use these to adjust the total factor productivity growth and 
calculate a compositionally adjusted measure of changing labour shares, as described in 
Appendix B.19  Second, I use the EU KLEMS database, developed by the University of  
Groningen with a consortium of diverse partners, which divides private sector productivity 
growth in a variety of advanced economies into 29 comprehensive sectors.20  After removing 
transition economies, where productivity growth and factor allocations are likely to be driven by 
considerations outside this paper, the sample consists of 18 countries, namely:  Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  The 
productivity estimates run from 1970 to 2005, with the available years varying by country.  I 
shall refer to these data as the OECD or OECD 18 sample, notwithstanding their development in 
the European Union.  Measures of annual unemployment for the US and the OECD countries are 
drawn from the Federal Reserve St. Louis FRED database. 
Turning to potential instruments, I consider simple measures of my own alongside the 
                                                 
19The adjusted and unadjusted industry measures of total factor productivity growth are available on my 
website.  My calculations indicate that adjustments for the changing sex x age x education composition of the labour 
force lower economy-wide private sector total factor productivity growth between 1987 and 2010 from an average of 
.0125 per annum to .0097 per annum. 
20There are actually 31 private sectors, but two (“private households with employed persons” and “extra-
territorial organizations”) are relatively minor and do not appear in all instances.  Employment shares are always 
calculated relative to national totals (including the public sector).  Although the EU KLEMS TFP calculations adjust 
for the composition of the workforce, the data provided only allow for the calculation of the distribution of total 
workers by sector (not workers by type), so I use the labour income share times the change in the total employment 
share as the X variable, as in eqn (7) above.  (7) and (17) are identical if the distribution of workers by type is 
proportional to the industry share of total employment, i.e. Li j =Lj(Li/L).  For the US KLEMS, I find that substituting 
the changing shares of total employment for the changing shares of employment by worker type yields virtually 
identical results, as reported in a footnote below. 
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more sophisticated constructions of others.  Using FRED, Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) and World Bank data, the instruments I prepare are: (1) the ln change 
in country defense expenditures over GDP; (2) the average ln change in metal prices (aluminum, 
copper, iron ore, lead, nickel, platinum, tin and zinc); and (3) the average ln change in oil prices 
(Dubai and West Texas Intermediate).  Changes in defense expenditures, driven by events such 
as the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11, are arguably exogenous to sectoral productivity 
growth.  There is less reason to feel confident in the exogeneity of metals and oil prices.  
Productivity change in key producing or using industries in the US and the OECD countries, 
which are large actors in the global markets for these materials, might produce endogenous 
responses in prices.  While US defense spending and materials and oil prices are available for all 
years of my TFP data, because of changes in concepts and coverage, the SIPRI data on OECD 
country military expenditures only extend back to 1988.21 
I expand the list of potential instruments by adding all 15 of the non-technology shock 
instruments considered by Stock and Watson (2012) in their dynamic factor model analysis of the 
US economy.  Covering oil prices, monetary policy, uncertainty, liquidity and fiscal policy, these 
are:22  (1) Hamilton’s (2003) measure of the increase of the oil price PPI relative to the max of 
the previous 3 years, available for 1962-2010; (2) Kilian’s (2008) measure of OPEC production 
shortfall from wars and civil strife, available for 1971-2004; (3) the residuals of Ramey & Vine’s 
(2010) measure of full gasoline prices regressed on lagged macroeconomic variables, based on 
                                                 
21The SIPRI website notes that SIPRI has not been able to construct a consistent series extending back to 
earlier dates, and the SIPRI data has now become the standard, reproduced in other on-line sources (such as the 
World Bank) to the exclusion of any other information.  I tried to construct an alternative series of my own using 
historical paper issues of The Military Balance, but ultimately concluded that SIPRI’s concerns about coverage and 
data quality are correct. 
22In most cases I use the data provided on-line by Stock and Watson and follow their procedures (e.g. 
AR(2)s, regressions on lagged macro variables, etc) to construct the instruments.  The dataset, however, contains a 
major misreporting of the Ramey-Vine figures (formulas rather than values were copied into the Stock & Watson 
spreadsheet), so I use the updated data from Valerie Ramey’s website.  
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their updated spreadsheet (available 1959-2011); (4) Romer and Romer’s (2004) residual of Fed 
monetary intentions regressed on internal Fed forecasts (1969-1996); (5) Smets and Wouters’ 
(2007), updated by King and Watson (2012), measure of the shock to the monetary policy 
reaction function in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (1959-2004); (6) Sims and 
Zha’s (2006) monetary policy shock estimated in a structural VAR (1960-2002); (7) Gürkaynak, 
Sack and Swanson’s (2005) measure of surprise changes in the federal funds rate (1990-2004); 
(8) innovations in an AR(2) of the VIX, as suggested by Bloom (2009) (1962-2011); (9) 
innovations in an AR(2) of Baker, Bloom and Davis’s (2012) policy uncertainty index calculated 
from media references to economic policy (1985-2011); (10) innovations in an AR(2) of the TED 
spread, as provided by Stock & Watson (1971-2011); (11) innovations in an AR(2) of Gilchrist-
Zakrajšek’s (2012) bond premium (1973-2010); (12) Bassett et al’s (2011) measure of 
unpredictable changes in bank-level lending standards (1992-2010); (13) Ramey’s (2011) 
measure of news of changes in the net present value of military spending divided by nominal 
GDP (1959-2010); (14) Fisher and Peters’ (2010) measure of excess returns on stocks of military 
contractors (1959-2008); and (15) Romer and Romer’s (2010) measure of tax changes relative to 
GDP (1959-2007).  I average quarterly or monthly shocks to annual levels. 
With the exception of Kilian’s oil production shortfall, the Stock & Watson instruments 
listed above are US-centered and not appropriate for an OECD analysis.  However, as shown in 
the pages below, none of these instruments performs at all well in the analysis of the US 
KLEMS.  Hence, undertaking the monumental task of developing similar instruments country by 
country is not likely to be profitable.  In fact, the only instrument that consistently satisfies the 
first stage requirement of significance and the second stage exclusion restriction is defense 
spending.  Thus, my main point in using Stock & Watson’s extensive list is to highlight the 
difficulty of finding alternative instruments for sectoral labor allocations. 
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 (b) Results 
 I begin by evaluating the suitability of the various instruments to the problem at hand.  In 
Table I below I run the 1st stage regression of the specification of equation (19) using one 
instrument at a time, reporting the p-value of the F test on the instrument23 and the total number 
of observations.  In the case of the OECD, I only use my instruments and Kilian’s oil production 
shortfall, which can be considered part of global trends.  There are two notable aspects of Table I.  
First, virtually all of the factors considered by Stock and Watson (instruments d through r) are not 
meaningful determinants of labour allocations.  Only the oil price max measure and Federal 
Funds surprises are significant at the 5% level, and these results are suspect as other measures of 
oil prices and monetary policy are quite insignificant.  Second, in the OECD sample none of the 
instruments are even close to being significant.   
 Table I’s results are perhaps not terribly surprising.  To generate a significant reallocation 
of labour across sectors, an instrument must not merely shift macroeconomic supply and demand, 
it must substantially alter relative industry supply or demand away from the norm.  Many shocks 
which have strong aggregate macroeconomic consequences and serve as good instruments for the 
analysis of macro aggregates might not have sufficiently strong relative effects for the objective 
of this paper.   In this regard it is noteworthy that Ramey’s (2011) measure of news of changes in 
the NPV of military spending is insignificant.  Ramey argues that, in explaining changes in 
macroeconomic aggregates in the United States, her news variable dominates actual defense 
spending changes.  The macroeconomic influence of Ramey’s news variable, however, most 
likely represents the response of private economic actors to the foreseen aggregate consequences 
(e.g. on demand and tax burdens) of that spending.  Continuity of private demand suggests that 
                                                 
23Although in each case there is only one instrument, its coefficient is allowed to vary by industry x country, 
hence an F-test rather than a t-statistic. 
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Table I:  1st Stage P-value in Regression of Weighted Employment Share Changes on Instruments 
(instruments evaluated one at a time using specification of eqn 19) 
 
United States 
60 sectors 
1987-2010 
OECD 18 
29 sectors 
1970-2005  
 F p-v. N F p-v. N 
(a) ∆ ln Country Defense Expenditures/GDP 
(b) ∆ ln Metals Prices 
(c) ∆ ln Oil Prices 
(d) Oil Price Increase Over Prior Maximum (Hamilton 2003 ) 
(e) OPEC Oil Production Shortfall (Kilian 2008) 
(f) Residual of US Gasoline Prices (Ramey & Vine 2010) 
(g) Monetary Policy Shock  (Romer & Romer 2004) 
(h) Monetary Policy Reaction Shock (Smets & Wouters 2007) 
(i) Monetary Policy Shock (Sims & Zha 2006) 
(j) Fed. Funds Surprises (Gürkaynak et al 2005) 
(k) VIX Innovation (Bloom 2009) 
(l) Policy Uncertainty Index Innovation (Baker et al 2012) 
(m) TED Spread Innovation (Stock & Watson 2012) 
(n) Bond Premium Innovation (Gilchrist & Kayrajšek 2012) 
(o) Bank Lending Shocks (Basett et al 2011) 
(p) NPV Defense Spending News/GDP (Ramey 2011) 
(q) Excess Returns on Defense Stocks (Fisher & Peters 2010) 
(r) Tax Changes/GDP (Romer & Romer 2010) 
.000 
.000 
.833 
.005 
.253 
.965 
.866 
.084 
.884 
.000 
.863 
.092 
1.00 
1.00 
.992 
.104 
.432 
.108 
1380 
1380 
1380 
1380 
1020 
1380 
540 
1020 
900 
900 
1380 
1380 
1380 
1380 
1140 
1380 
1260 
1200 
.192 
.374 
.367 
 
.762 
 
8049 
12109 
12109 
 
11617 
 
   Notes:  F p-v. = F-test p-value on the industry x country coefficients associated with the instrument.  N = observations, 
sample changes with the availability of the instrument.  Instruments (d) – (r) calculated using data from Stock and 
Watson 2012; instruments (a)-(c) based upon FRED, SIPRI and World Bank data, as described in the text.  Each 
regression follows the 1st stage specification given in (19), with industry x country and country x year fixed effects and 
the national unemployment rate change and instruments entered separately for each industry x country.  The dependent 
variable is the labour share weighted change in the share of employment by worker type.  Each row represents a separate 
analysis with the indicated instrument alone. 
 
these are unlikely to have large effects on the distribution of economic activity, even if they affect 
levels.  In contrast, actual defense spending shifts the pattern of demand away from the private 
norm, resulting in more significant changes in sectoral employment shares.  Thus, Ramey’s 
finding for macroeconomic aggregates need not extend to my analysis of labour allocations.  
When entered jointly with actual defense spending changes in the 1st stage regression for the US, 
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I find the p–value on the F-test of Ramey’s news variable to be .313, while that on actual defense 
spending changes remains .000.  The insignificance of defense spending in the OECD regressions 
stems from the fact that for 3358 of the 8049 observations defense spending changes are zero.  
Defense spending as a share of GDP is extremely stable in most OECD countries and, with low 
values and one decimal precision in the SIPRI data, the sudden changes that do occur are mostly 
likely reflective of rounding error (e.g. moving from .9 percent of GDP previously to 1.0 percent 
ever after in one year in Japan). 
 Table II presents 2nd stage results using each of the four instruments which are significant 
at the 5% level in the 1st stage regressions for the United States in Table I (EU KLEMS results 
are presented later).  Aside from the estimate of ξ, the elasticity of worker efficacy with respect to 
the sectoral employment share, I also report the p-value of the 1st stage F-test (which will vary 
across specifications) and the 2nd stage χ2 overidentification test.24  In the top panel, which 
follows the baseline specification of equation (19), three of the four instrumental variables 
estimates of ξ are substantially negative, although the only statistically significant estimate is that 
found using defense expenditures.  Defense spending, however, is the only instrument which 
 
                                                 
24As noted earlier, an overidentification test is possible with one instrument because, since it is entered 
separately for each industry, there are technically actually I (equal to the number of industries) instruments. The 
overidentification test is whether these instruments have any predictive value in the regression beyond their 
association with changes in employment shares. 
As the reader might worry that this is somehow econometrically wrong, I have used Monte Carlo 
simulations to confirm the accuracy of the test statistic.  Using the covariance of the residuals from the first and 
second stage regressions of the baseline specification with defense expenditures, I produce 500,000 simulated draws 
of the data under the assumption that (modulo their influence on employment shares) defense expenditures are 
exogenous in the second stage regression.  The resulting test statistic is nearly exact, i.e. the nominal rejection values 
are very close to the actual rejection probabilities (see the next paragraph). 
I should also note that Basmann (1960) argues that the standard (Sargan 1958) χ2 overidentification test is 
too conservative (i.e. rejects the null too frequently) in finite samples and proposes a small sample adjustment to the 
test statistic.  I have confirmed his argument, for my case, using the Monte Carlo simulations described above. I find 
Sargan’s χ2 test to be grossly conservative (rejecting, as examples, 15.5% of the time at the 5% level and 4.6% of the 
time at the 1% level), while Basmann’s small sample correction is only slightly conservative (rejecting 5.8% of the 
time at the 5% level and 1.3% of the time at the 1% level) but very close to being exact.  Consequently, throughout 
this paper I use Basmann’s statistic as the overidentification test. 
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Table II:  Annual TFP Growth on Changes in Employment Shares 
(United States: 60 sectors x 1987-2010) 
OLS 2SLS by type of instrument 
 ∆ Defense 
Spending 
∆ Metals 
Prices 
Oil Price 
Maximum 
Fed Funds 
Surprises 
(1) Baseline specification (equation 19) 
ξ (s.e.) -.218 (.108) -.922 (.266) -.546 (.318) .372 (.384) -.468 (.318) 
F & χ2  p-v.  .000 & .148 .000 & .004 .005 & .000 .000 & .000 
N/K/L 1380 1380/199/59 1380/199/59 1380/199/59 900/191/59 
(2) Dropping unemployment controls by industry (business cycle adjustment) 
ξ (s.e.) -.167 (.100) -.359 (.226) -.245 (.452) .359 (.396) -.742 (.412) 
F & χ2  p-v.  .000 & .031 .440 & .000 .033 & .000 .371 & .002 
(3) Substituting ln changes in capacity utilization for unemployment controls 
ξ (s.e.) -.240 (.100) -.689 (.222) -.465 (.346) .363 (.375) -.654 (.343) 
F & χ2  p-v.  .000 & .009 .003 & .478 .029 & .000 .044 & .950 
(4) Adding ln changes in capacity utilization to unemployment controls 
ξ (s.e.) -.207 (.109) -.771 (.254) -.457 (.332) .372 (.364) -.596 (.319) 
F & χ2  p-v.  .000 & .260 .000 & .427 .003 & .000 .000 & .663 
(5) Dropping country x year dummies (common component of TFP growth) 
ξ (s.e.) -.257 (.107) -1.03 (.263) -.738 (.318) .372 (.390) -.541 (.317) 
F & χ2  p-v.  .000 & .146 .000 & .001 .007 & .000 .000 & .000 
(6) Dropping one industry at a time 
Max ξ (s.e.) -.119 (.107) -.812 (.264) -.300 (.325) .636 (.441) -.045 (.315) 
Min ξ (s.e.) -.328 (.113) -1.13 (.312) -.915 (.318) -.007 (.386) -.872 (.363) 
Max F p-v.  .000 .015 .048 .003 
Min F p-v.  .000 .000 .001 .000 
Max χ2  p-v.  .582 .067 .004 .000 
Min χ2  p-v.  .075 .001 .000 .000 
(7) Adding 4 lags of employment share changes 
∑ ξ (s.e.) -.685 (.209) -.750 (.283) -.547 (.338) -.233 (.348) -.621 (.359) 
F & χ2 p-v.  .000 & .068 .048 & .002 .083 & .009 .000 & .000 
   Notes:  ξ  (s.e) = coefficient (standard error) on labour share weighted changes of employment shares by worker 
type.  F & χ2 p-v. = p-value on 1st stage significance and 2nd stage overidentification tests.  N/K/L = number of 
observations/number of regressors in 1st stage/excluded instruments in 2nd stage.  Because of the joint year and 
industry dummies, one of the industry coefficients for each of the variables entered by industry (i.e. unemployment 
and capacity changes and instruments) is co-linear with other variables and is dropped in all specifications other 
than those without year dummies.  Thus, there are only 59 excluded instruments in the baseline specification.  ∑ ξ = 
sum of the coefficients on current & four lags of weighted employment share changes. 
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does not strongly reject the 2nd stage exclusion restriction.  I confirm the likely endogeneity of the 
oil price instrument by correlating its 1st stage industry coefficients with the average energy share 
of gross output in those industries.  If this instrument represents exogenous shifts in prices, then 
its effect should be substantially negatively correlated with the energy intensity of production, i.e. 
industries which are more energy intensive should see their relative employment share fall with 
exogenous increases in oil prices, as their supply curves shift up.  In practice, I find a correlation 
coefficient of .232.  While not significant (p-value = .077), the correlation is of the wrong sign.  
This might occur if some of the increases in the price of oil represent an endogenous positive 
response to rising energy demand in using industries.  In sum, of 18 potential instruments, only 1 
(defense expenditures) satisfies the dual requirements of 1st stage significance and 2nd stage 
exogeneity, and that instrument produces a strongly negative (-.922) estimate of ξ. 
The lower panels of Table II examine the sensitivity of the results to the specification.  In 
panel (2) I remove the unemployment rate entered by industry.  This has a very large impact on 
the estimates, dramatically reducing the estimate of ξ for both defense expenditures and metal 
prices, raising it for Federal Funds surprises, and rendering both metals prices and Fed surprises 
completely insignificant in the 1st stage regression.   In panel (3) I substitute the Federal Reserve's 
estimate of aggregate mining, manufacturing and utilities capacity utilization for the 
unemployment rate, interacting it by industry as was done for unemployment.  As shown, this 
moves ξ back to the estimates of panel (1), although the value using defense expenditures (-.689) 
is less extreme than in the baseline specification (-.922).  The Fed’s measure of capacity 
utilization, however, does not exhaust the association of industry productivity and labour 
allocations with the business cycle.  Adding the measure of aggregate capacity utilization to the 
baseline specification with unemployment and defense spending, I find that the industry 
coefficients on the unemployment rate in both the 1st and 2nd stage regressions remain highly 
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significant (F p-values of .000 & .003, respectively), suggesting that the business cycle 
characteristics of relative industry productivity and employment may go beyond capacity 
utilization and mismeasurement to something real.  The estimate of ξ from defense spending in 
this specification is -.711 (panel 4).  In general, controlling for the association between the 
business cycle and relative labour allocations and productivity seems appropriate25 and this 
matters in the regression because the correlation between defense spending changes and changes 
in the unemployment rate in this time period is quite strong (.652 with a p-value of .001).  
Nevertheless, the reader looking to see whether the defense spending results can be rendered 
insignificant need look no further than panel (2).  Panel (5) of Table II shows that removing the 
year dummies, but retaining the unemployment controls, generally increases the magnitude of ξ, 
with the negative estimate using metals prices now appearing significant. 
 Panel (6) of Table II explores whether identification and significance come from one 
particular industry by rerunning the baseline specification 60 times, removing one industry each 
time, and reporting the maximum-minimum range of the estimates of ξ and the F & χ2 p-values.  
As shown, the estimates of ξ based upon the non-defense instruments vary enormously, but the 
range for defense expenditures is much more limited.  Also of note is the stability of the 1st and 
2nd stage tests for defense expenditures.  Regardless of which industry is removed, defense 
spending is always found to be highly significant in the 1st stage regression and exogenous in the 
2nd stage overidentification test.  In fact, removing all possible combinations of two and even 
three industries, the 1st stage p-value on defense spending never rises above 2.3x10-8, the p-value 
on its 2nd stage overidentification test never falls below .011, and the coefficient never becomes 
less negative than -.590 (274).  Thus, the correlations between defense expenditures, employment 
                                                 
25To see this, the reader might introspect and consider their reaction if I had informed them that the estimate 
of ξ was substantially negative, but only when measures of the business cycle are excluded from the regression.   
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and productivity that lie behind the significant coefficients reported in the top panel of Table II 
go far beyond one, two or even three key industries.  
The estimates using annual data in Table II might not provide an accurate representation 
of long run effects.  On the one hand, it is possible that short run coefficients overstate the 
negative influence of the employment share on sectoral productivity as workers entering a sector 
are likely to be less productive initially than they will be in the long run, once they acquire sector 
specific human capital.  On the other hand, it is possible that short run coefficients actually 
understate the negative effect of the employment share on sectoral productivity.  Worker 
reallocations come about through changes in equilibrium output, either due to a shift of supply or 
demand.  A sudden increase in output will lead to an influx of workers and, typically, a transitory 
rise in capacity utilization, producing a transitory overstatement of productivity.26  Thus, this 
mismeasurement of productivity will be positively correlated with the movement of workers into 
a sector, understating the negative influence this otherwise has on measured productivity.27 
 Panel (7) in Table II addresses the issue of long run effects by adding four lagged values 
of the labour share weighted change in employment shares as pre-determined exogenous right-
hand side variables to the baseline specification, with current employment reallocations 
instrumented with the instrument specified in each column.  The cumulative effect on long run 
measured productivity is given by the sum of the current and lagged coefficients, which is 
presented in the table.  Comparing these with the baseline results at the top of the table, one sees 
                                                 
26This applies even for instruments that shift the supply curve, provided they satisfy the exclusion 
restriction, i.e. are not directly correlated with total factor productivity growth.  If something shifts the supply curve 
down without changing fundamental productive capacity, it will lead to an expansion of output which, along with the 
rise in the employment share, should produce a transitory increase in capacity utilization. 
27As there are now a variety of mismeasurements, I should clarify.  The object of interest in this paper is the 
mismeasurement of productivity due to the failure to account for the changing efficacy of workers as a sector’s 
employment share expands.   The transitory mismeasurement due to capacity utilization, however, works in the 
opposite direction and may temporarily conceal the effect I’m studying. 
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that ξ is now somewhat smaller in magnitude in the defense expenditures analysis (-.750 vs. -.922 
earlier), while the oil price maximum, which earlier reported an insignificant positive coefficient, 
is no longer 1st stage significant and now produces a negative point estimate of ξ.  The metals 
prices coefficient is unchanged, while that for Fed surprises is more negative. 
 Table II also reports OLS results, running each specification without instruments.  
Although the baseline OLS relation between employment share changes and productivity (-.218) 
is small, the long run cumulative association, as evidenced by panel (7)'s regression with lags of 
past employment changes, is much more negative (-.685).  It is difficult to explain how past 
employment changes relate negatively to current productivity growth within a framework where 
employment shares reflect the endogenous response of demand to shifts of the supply curve 
brought about by productivity change.  The result is easier to comprehend, however, if one moves 
to a framework where changes in employment shares reflect exogenous shifts of the demand 
curve brought about by non-unitary income elasticities of demand and other shocks to relative 
demand.  When demand shifts out in an industry, it produces a transitory rise in capacity 
utilization and a spurious rise in productivity, minimizing the negative effect of employment 
shifts on measured productivity.  Over time, however, capacity adjusts and the full impact is 
revealed.  Evidence in favour of this argument can be found by regressing total factor 
productivity growth on industry output growth, with industry, year and unemployment x industry 
controls as in the baseline specification.  With only current output growth in the regression, the 
OLS coefficient (s.e.) is .219 (.025).  With four lags of past output in the regression, the 
cumulative OLS coefficient is .076 (.058).  Thus, past output increases, like past employment 
increases, lead to lower current productivity growth, which is consistent with the capacity 
utilization story outlined above.  
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Table III:  Response of Capacity Utilization and Productivity 
to Output and Employment Share Changes (22 industries, 1987-2010) 
X variable ∆ Output ∆ Employment Share 
Y variable  ∆ Cap U ∆ TFP ∆ Cap U ∆ TFP 
(1) OLS:  Current value of X  
Coef (s.e.) .548 (.028) .186 (.036) 1.70 (204) .137 (.215) 
(2) OLS:  Adding four lagged values of X 
∑ Coef (s.e.) .035 (.050) -.096 (.084) -.364 (.343) -1.11 (.420) 
(3) 2SLS:  Current value of X instrumented with ∆ defense expenditures 
Coef (s.e.) .070 (.086) -.192 (.097) -.030 (.487) -1.57 (509) 
F & χ2  p-v. .000 & .891 .000 & .103 .000 & .929 .000 & .236 
N/K/L 506/85/21 506/85/21 506/85/21 506/85/21 
(4) 2SLS:  Adding four pre-determined lagged values of X 
∑ Coef (s.e.) -.041 (.060) -.248 (.100) -.234 (.399) -1.78 (.509) 
F & χ2  p-v. .000 & .568 .000 & .087 .005 & .771 .005 &.343 
N/K/L 418/85/21 418/85/21 418/85/21 418/85/21 
   Notes:  ∆ Cap U = ln change in Federal Reserve Board’s measure of industry capacity utilization; ∆ TFP = ln 
change in TFP index, adjusted for labour quality (dependent variable in Tables I and II); Coef  (s.e) = coefficient 
(standard error) on the current X variable; ∑ Coef = sum of the coefficients on current & four lags of the X variable.  
F & χ2 p-v. and N/K/L as in Table II. 
 
 Table III supports the preceding argument using the Federal Reserve Board’s industry 
level measures of capacity utilization, defined as current output over maximum sustainable 
output.28  These measures are only available for the 22 mining, manufacturing and utilities 
industries in the 60 sector KLEMS disaggregation of private sector activity.  In this table I run 
regressions with either the change in capacity utilization or total factor productivity growth as the 
“Y” variables, and either the growth of output or the labour income share weighted change in the 
share of economywide employment by type, the right-hand side variable of interest in the 
                                                 
28These measures are based upon the Survey of Plant Capacity and are defined as “the greatest level of 
output the plant can maintain within the framework of a realistic work schedule after factoring in normal downtime 
and assuming sufficient availability of inputs to operate the capital in place” (Gilbert, Morin & Raddock 2000, p. 
194).  The survey measures are then regressed on a time trend, ln capital and dummies which correct for outliers.  
This suggests that the reported series is basically a smoothed version of the original data, allowing outliers that the 
Fed believes represents real changes. 
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regressions reported above, as the “X” variable.  Each regression includes a complete set of 
industry and time dummies and the change in the unemployment rate entered separately by 
industry, as in the baseline specification of equation (19).  Aside from results with the current 
value of “X” alone, I also report the cumulative sum of the coefficients in a specification with the 
current value and four predetermined lags of “X.” 
  I begin by taking both X variables as exogenous, running OLS specifications in the top 
two panels of the table.  In the first two columns we see that an increase in current output raises 
both capacity utilization and measured total factor productivity growth, but that the cumulative 
long run effect, once lags are allowed, is insignificantly different from zero in both cases.  In the 
third column of the table, we see that a 1% increase in a sector’s labour income share weighted 
employment share is associated with a large 1.7% short run rise in capacity utilization, but has no 
long run effects.  Regarding measured TFP, in the fourth column, an increase in the sectoral 
employment share has no significant short run impact on productivity, but a very large (-1.1) long 
run effect.  These results are completely consistent with a view of exogenous demand fluctuations 
producing transitory movements in capacity utilization which obscure the true effect of labour 
allocations on measured productivity.29    
The preceding is intended to be heuristic, and should not be taken completely literally.  In 
particular, one cannot interpret the results as necessarily indicating that all changes in equilibrium 
quantity demanded (and labour allocations) are exogenous to productivity.  To proceed more 
                                                 
29One can try to use the Fed’s industry capacity utilization measures to directly adjust productivity, but this 
raises additional issues.  First, an OLS regression approach is unsuitable, because industry capacity utilization is 
endogenous to industry productivity, but instruments for industry level capacity utilization are hard to find, as 
defense spending is uncorrelated with capacity utilization (see below).  Second, one can use the utilization estimates 
to mechanically adjust productivity, but this requires some assumptions about what is being over and underutilized 
(capital, capital and labour, or capital, labour and some material inputs like energy) and what would have to be 
changed to reach sustainable output.  For my purposes, however, it is sufficient to simply show that as capacity 
utilization effects disappear in the long run, the OLS relation between employment shares and productivity becomes 
decidedly negative. 
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carefully, the third and four panels of Table III instrument each X with defense expenditures, the 
instrument which I have previously found to be consistently 1st stage significant and 2nd stage 
exogenous.  As before, I enter the instrument separately for each industry, and as before the 1st 
and 2nd stage test statistics satisfy the requirements of 2SLS in an admirably robust and consistent 
fashion. 
Turning to coefficient estimates, the first notable result is that the first and third columns 
of panels (3) and (4) indicate that defense expenditures, while moving around output and labour 
allocations, have absolutely no effect on industry level capacity utilization.  This is consistent 
with Ramey’s (2011) argument that defense spending changes are well anticipated by public 
news announcements.  While Ramey’s news variable is completely insignificant in the 1st stage 
regressions for this sample, as it was before, this merely confirms that the timing of news is 
different than the timing of actual expenditures.30  Nevertheless, actual expenditures, when they 
arrive, may be well anticipated, so that capacity utilization expands evenly with production 
needs.  Because defense spending has no observable impact on capacity utilization, the long and 
short term coefficients for productivity growth, in the second and fourth columns, are virtually 
identical.  The elasticity of observed productivity with respect to output is estimated to be around 
-.2 (s.e. of about .1).  The coefficient on labour share weighted changes in employment shares, 
which following the theory above is interpretable as the elasticity of average worker efficacy with 
respect to the employment share, is found to be about -1.5 in this sample of only 22 industries 
                                                 
30Using Ramey’s variable as the instrument in the 1st stage regressions for output and employment share 
changes, I get p-values on the F-tests of .161 and .483 respectively.   Running Ramey’s instrument jointly with 
current expenditures in these regressions, I get p-values of .837 and .992 on her news variable and .000 and .000 on 
actual expenditures.  As emphasized earlier above, none of this invalidates Ramey’s point that her news variable 
does a better job of explaining changes in macroeconomic aggregates, which will be influenced by the reaction of 
private economic actors to the anticipated future consequences of those expenditures.  This is a distinct, however, 
from moving actual patterns of production away from the private norm, in which actual expenditures have a more 
significant effect. 
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(s.e. of about .5).  This is greater in absolute magnitude than the maximum of -1 allowable by 
theory, but not (statistically) significantly so.   
To summarize the results for the US KLEMS, out of 18 potential instruments, defense 
spending is the only one that consistently and strongly satisfies the dual requirements of 1st stage 
significance and 2nd stage exogeneity.  Long and short term effects for defense spending are quite 
similar, as defense spending does not have much of an influence on capacity utilization.  The 
long term OLS association between changing labour allocations and measured productivity is 
much more negative than the short term relation, and this appears to reflect transitory capacity 
utilization changes consistent with exogenous shifts in demand.  The long term OLS estimate of 
the elasticity of worker efficacy with respect to employment shares in the total US KLEMS 
sample (-.685 in Table II) is not significantly different from that arrived at using defense 
expenditures as an instrument (-.750).  Thus, while there may be some endogeneity of labour 
allocations, it probably accounts for a relatively small share of the total variation (exogenous plus  
endogenous) in this variable.31 
 Turning now to the EU KLEMS OECD data, as I do not have any instrument that is 1st 
stage significant in the analysis of the entire data set, I focus on country specific results.  Since 
defense spending is a robustly significant and exogenous instrument in the US KLEMS data, I 
begin by running country by country 1st stage regressions using defense spending as an 
                                                 
31As noted earlier, while the preceding analysis is based upon my labour composition adjustment of BLS 
TFP growth and my estimates of changing sectoral employment shares by type, results are quite similar if I use the 
original BLS data on productivity and labour allocations without differentiation by worker type.  For example, using 
defense spending as an instrument, I get the following estimates (s.e.) of ξ for the panels in Table II:  Panel I: -1.06 
(.275); II: -.373 (.218); III: -.722 (.218);  IV: -1.03 (.275); V: -1.17 (.269); and VII: -.769 (.292).  These follow the 
patterns presented in the table.  The corresponding short term and long term OLS results (panels I & VII) are -.377 
(.122) and -.809 (.218).  In Table III, looking at columns (4)-(6) in panels III and IV, where employment share 
changes are instrumented with defense expenditures, I get insignificant short and long term coefficients for capacity 
utilization of -.062 (.475) and -.390 (.376), short and long term coefficients for BLS measured TFP growth of -1.82 
(.502) and -1.84 (.514), and short and long term coefficients for capacity utilization adjusted BLS TFP growth of -
1.75 (.540) and -1.45 (.580).  Again, these results parallel those reported above. 
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Table IV:  Country level analysis using EU KLEMS Data 
(29 sectors, 1970-2005)  
 Australia Finland Netherlands United Kingdom 
(1) Baseline specification (equation 19) with ∆ defense expenditures/GDP as instrument 
ξ (s.e.) -1.09  (.185) -.310 (.359) -.264 (.335) -.886 (.153) 
F & χ2  p-v. .004 & .901 .000 & .841 .005 & .290 .000 & .631 
N/K/L 493/100/28 493/100/28 493/100/28 493/100/28 
(2) Dropping one industry at a time 
Max ξ (s.e.) -1.03 (.176) -.079 (.395) .152 (.406) -.727 (.165) 
Min ξ (s.e.) -1.18 (.193) -.682 (.406) -.472 (.366) -1.10 (.198) 
Max F p-v. .012 .004 .038 .001 
Min F p-v. .002 .000 .002 .000 
Max χ2  p-v. .960 .941 .691 .809 
Min χ2  p-v. .653 .712 .026 .534 
(3) Adding 4 lags of employment share changes 
∑ ξ (s.e.) -1.15 (.307) -.801 (.424) -.560 (.407) -.985 (.206) 
F & χ2  p-v. .014 & .873 .000 & .728 .001 & .272 .000 & .928 
  Notes:  As in Table II. 
 
 
instrument.  I then proceed to the 2nd stage analysis for the four non-US countries where I find 
defense spending to be 1st stage significant at the 5% level (namely Australia, Finland, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom).  As shown in Table IV, in each of these countries defense 
spending satisfies the 2nd stage exclusion requirement and produces negative estimates of ξ, 
although only the large point estimates of Australia and the United Kingdom are statistically 
significant.  Removing one industry at a time, I find that defense spending robustly satisfies the 
1st and 2nd stage significance and exclusion requirements.  The point estimates of ξ vary greatly 
for Finland and the Netherlands and much less so for Australia and the United Kingdom, in 
keeping with their relative standard errors in the baseline specification.  Adding lags of 
employment share changes to the regression produces a much larger estimate of the cumulative 
negative effect of reallocation on productivity, particularly for Finland and the Netherlands.  
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 The EU KLEMS data base has two sets of estimates for the United States, one covering 
1977-2005 based upon the current NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) used 
in the US KLEMS, and another covering 1970-2005 based upon the historical SIC (Standard 
Industrial Classification).  The industrial sectors in both series share the same nominal titles and 
have TFP estimates grouped into the same 29 private sector division that I use in the general 
analysis of (SIC-based) EU KLEMS data for other countries.32  Both of these series provide a 
longer time series than the BLS’ US KLEMS (covering 1987-2010) and appear to be developed 
independently of that source.  As in the case of the US KLEMS, I run 1st stage regressions for 
each of the 18 instruments in Table I and then proceed to a 2nd stage analysis with those 
instruments which are significant at the 5% level. 
 Table V reports second stage results for the six instruments which are 1st stage significant 
at the 5% level in the EU KLEMS US NAICS data.  Defense expenditures operate much as in the 
analysis of the US KLEMS, producing an extremely large negative estimate of ξ in the baseline 
specification, 1st and 2nd stage significance and exclusion test statistics that are quite robust to the 
removal of one industry at a time, and (once lags are accounted for) a somewhat smaller estimate 
of the cumulative effect of employment changes.  The oil price maximum, which produced a 
positive point estimate of ξ earlier in Table I, generates a ξ of -1.1 in this case.  However, 
notwithstanding its statistical significance in the baseline specification, with the removal of one 
industry this coefficient is easily made positive.  The remaining four instruments produce a 
cornucopia of insignificant results in the baseline regression, are often quite sensitive to the 
removal of one industry at a time and, when employment change lags are added, produce big 
cumulative negative estimates of ξ and are found to be utterly insignificant in the 1st stage 
                                                 
32Whenever I refer to results using all of the EU KLEMS data, as in Table I’s 1st stage regressions, I use the 
SIC version of the US data, in keeping with the SIC definitions used for other countries. 
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Table V:  US analysis using NAICS based US data in EU KLEMS (by instrument) 
(29 sectors, 1977-2005) 
 
∆ Defense 
Spending 
∆ Oil  
Prices 
Oil Price 
Maximum 
Smets/Wouters 
M Shock 
Sims/Zha 
M Shock 
TED Spread 
Innovation 
(1) Baseline specification (equation 19) 
ξ (s.e.) -1.06 (.425) -.838 (.424) -1.13 (.331) -.740 (.413) .932 (.476) .047 (.328) 
F & χ2  p-v. .003 & .524 .003 & .000 .000 & .000 .002 & .307 .007 & .869 .000 & .001 
N/K/L 812/111/28 812/111/28 812/111/28 783/110/28 725/108/28 812/111/28 
(2) Dropping one industry at a time 
Max ξ (s.e.) -.873 (.427) .667 (.554) .282 (.404) -.520 (.426) 1.08 (.510) .241 (.361) 
Min ξ (s.e.) -1.20 (.455) -1.43 (.435) -1.72 (.363) -1.10 (.463) .763 (.530) -.380 (.333) 
Max F p-v. .012 .155 .000 .079 .048 .000 
Min F p-v. .001 .002 .000 .000 .003 .000 
Max χ2  p-v. .697 .001 .011 .440 .942 .009 
Min χ2  p-v. .362 .000 .000 .205 .693 .000 
(3) Adding 4 lags of employment share changes 
∑ ξ (s.e.) -.851 (.394) -2.16 (.500) -1.86 (.404) -.944 (.456) -.626 (.607) -.809 (.457) 
F & χ2  p-v. .045 & .528 .339 & .020 .018 & .082 .271 & .066 .865 & .988 .396 & .000 
   Notes:  As in Table II. 
 
regression.  In sum, as in the analysis of the BLS US data, only defense spending consistently 
satisfies the 1st and 2nd stage tests, and that instrument produces an estimate of ξ close to -1. 
 Table VI reports second stage results for the six instruments which are 1st stage significant 
at the 5% level in the EU KLEMS US SIC data.  Three of these instruments (defense spending, 
oil price maximum, and the TED spread) overlap with the list for the EU KLEMS US NAICS 
data.   While the oil price maximum and TED spread produce results that are similar to those in 
the preceding table, those with defense expenditures are dramatically different.  Although defense 
spending is 1st stage significant and 2nd stage exogenous in the baseline specification, it produces 
a small and statistically insignificant estimate of ξ.   With lags, however, the coefficient becomes 
considerably more negative, albeit not statistically significant.  With regards to the remaining 
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Table VI:  US analysis using SIC based US data in EU KLEMS (by instrument) 
(29 sectors, 1970-2005) 
 
∆ Defense 
Spending 
Oil Price 
Maximum 
Residual 
Gas Prices 
Romer/Romer 
M Shock 
Fed Funds 
Surprises 
TED Spread 
Innovation 
(1) Baseline specification (equation 19) 
ξ (s.e.) -.118 (.251) -.821 (.350) -.329 (.413) .162 (.373) -.234 (.485) .086 (.326) 
F & χ2  p-v. .000 & .151 .000 & .000 .031 & .000 .036 & .385 .001 & .000 .000 & .644 
N/K/L 1015/118/28 1015/118/28 1015/118/28 754/109/28 435/98/28 1015/118/28 
(2) Dropping one industry at a time 
Max ξ (s.e.) -.048 (.240) -.173 (.369) -.035 (.400) .358 (.472) .412 (.557) .251 (.320) 
Min ξ (s.e.) -.191 (.468) -1.14 (.399) -2.49 (.981) -.006 (.384) -.599 (.483) -.072 (.446) 
Max F p-v. .000 .004 .926 .058 .013 .000 
Min F p-v. .000 .000 .019 .003 .000 .000 
Max χ2  p-v. .723 .000 .008 .676 .004 .876 
Min χ2  p-v. .009 .000 .000 .191 .000 .363 
(3) Adding 4 lags of employment share changes 
∑ ξ (s.e.) -.550 (.449) -1.55 (.395) -1.42 (.459) -1.14 (.532) -.351 (.640) -.760 (.384) 
F & χ2  p-v. .034 & .540 .000 & .000 .048 & .000 .206 & .748 .002 & .000 .000 & .879 
   Notes:  As in Table II. 
 
instruments, the point estimates are generally quite sensitive to the removal of one industry or the 
1st stage regression is rendered insignificant once lags are introduced.  With the introduction of 
lags the cumulative effect of employment changes becomes much more negative, although the 
TED spread is the only instrument in this specification that is strongly significant and exogenous.  
Its estimate of ξ is both substantially negative (-.760) and statistically significant. 
 As Tables V and VI suggest, there are peculiar differences between the SIC-based and 
NAICS-based EU KLEMS data for the United States.  The correlation between the annual 
industry x year total factor productivity growth in one dataset and the other, for the 29 nominally 
identical33 large private sector industry groupings and the 28 years that the two datasets overlap,  
                                                 
33E.g. “mining & quarrying”, “education”, “rubber and plastics”, etc. 
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is only .502 (i.e. an R2 of .25), despite the fact that they ostensibly measure exactly the same  
thing.  The labour income share weighted labour reallocation measures, however, are much more 
similar, with a correlation of .860 (R2 = .74).  Not surprisingly, this produces radically different 
regression results.  There are also some disturbing anomalies in the EU KLEMS SIC based US 
data and in the EU KLEMS data set as a whole.34  Such concerns are, however, somewhat beside 
the point, as it cannot be taken as altogether surprising that a single instrument, such as defense 
spending, will in some specifications or some data sets produce weaker results.   
 Before concluding, I present the OLS results for the EU KLEMS data.  As shown in Table 
VII, the results here closely parallel those for the United States.  Whether in the four European 
countries examined in the tables above, either of the SIC and NAICS versions of EU KLEMS US 
data, or the EU KLEMS database as a whole, the association between employment share changes 
and productivity growth is negative, but becomes much more so when past employment share 
changes are added to the regression.  As in the case of the US data, the difference between the 
current and cumulative coefficients lends itself to the interpretation that exogenous movements in 
demand produce transitory changes in capacity utilization which obscure the strongly negative 
long term association between employment shares and measured productivity.  The cumulative 
                                                 
34For example, between 1970 and 1981, according to the EU KLEMS SIC data, the relative value added 
price of private sector services to goods in the United States fell 27%, while the relative quantity rose by 25%, for a   
-2% change in relative nominal value added.  According to the current official US National Income and Product 
Accounts, however, during this same period the relative value added price of private sector services to goods actually 
declined only 5% (reflecting rising energy prices), while the relative quantity rose by 14%, for a +9% change in 
relative nominal value added (Chain47on.xls and VA74on.xls available at www.bea.gov).  The historical SIC series 
on the BEA website (GDPbyInd_VA_SIC.xls) does not provide real indices back to 1970, but in the 1977-1981 
period it shows an 8% increase in relative real service quantity and 5% decrease in relative price (similar to the 
current series 7% and 3% figures for the same period), while the EU KLEMS SIC data show a 15% increase in 
relative quantity and 13% decline in relative price.  In making these comparisons, I follow the BEA’s definition of 
goods (agriculture, mining, manufacturing and construction) and services (all other private sector). 
As another example, in the EU KLEMS data one finds that in 3% of the observations with total factor 
productivity estimates capital income is negative, averaging -.14 of value added and -.05 of gross output and ranging 
as far as -5.7 times value added or -.33 of gross output.  In these observations, appearing in 16 countries, one gets 
very close (R2 = .985) to the EU KLEMS estimate of total factor productivity growth by dropping capital growth 
while using the gross output shares of intermediate inputs and labour (i.e. weights which combined now exceed 1) to 
calculate the contribution of these inputs to output growth. 
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Table VII:  OLS Regressions using EU KLEMS (29 sectors, 1971-2005) 
 Australia Finland Netherlands UK US NAICS US SIC OECD 18 
(1) Baseline specification with employment share changes (equation 19) 
ξ (s.e.) -.875 (.061) -.266 (.095) -.485 (.092) -.777 (.068) -.518 (.119) -.344 (.094) -.422 (.023) 
N 667 1015 754 986 812 1015 12109 
(2) Adding 4 lags of employment share changes 
∑ ξ (s.e.) -.941 (.202) -.726 (.148) -.756 (.181) -1.05 (.126) -.946 (.197) -.929 (.196) -.615 (.048) 
N 551 889 638 870 696 899 10025 
   Notes:  As in Table II. 
 
OLS coefficients are in most cases quite close to the corresponding cumulative coefficients using 
2SLS, suggesting that much of the variation in labour shares is exogenous.  I recognize of course 
that this interpretation, taking employment shares as being exogenous and OLS coefficients as 
accurate representations of causal relations, is awfully convenient in a paper which struggles to 
find more than one robust instrument. 
 The EU KLEMS results, by and large, confirm the analysis using the US KLEMS.  
Defense spending is the only instrument which is consistently 1st stage significant, 2nd stage 
exogenous and robust, both in terms of test statistics and coefficient point estimates, to the 
selective removal of industries.  Long term OLS elasticities are more negative than short term 
relations.  The cumulative estimate of ξ, both OLS and 2SLS with defense spending, is always 
more negative than -.5 and often much closer to the theoretical limit of -1.  Standard errors, 
however, are very large and coefficient estimates in particular specifications and samples are not 
significantly different from zero.  Thus, while the preponderance of evidence suggests that 
average worker efficacy does indeed fall with a sector’s employment share, there is substantial 
uncertainty regarding the precise magnitude of the elasticity. 
 I conclude by simply considering how different values of ξ change our assessment of 
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Table VIII:  Average Total Factor Productivity Growth with Roy Adjustments 
 United States  
(1987-2010, based on US KLEMS) 
18 OECD countries  
(1970-2005, based on EU KLEMS) 
ξ Goods Services Aggregate Goods Services Aggregate 
0.00 
-0.25 
-0.50 
-0.75 
-1.00 
.0157 
.0134 
.0110 
.0087 
.0064 
.0073 
.0078 
.0084 
.0090 
.0095 
.0097 
.0094 
.0091 
.0088 
.0085 
.0157 
.0131 
.0104 
.0077 
.0051 
.0017 
.0036 
.0055 
.0074 
.0094 
.0070 
.0072 
.0074 
.0076 
.0079 
   Notes:  Goods, services and aggregate calculated from BLS KLEMS and EU KLEMS 60 sector and 29 
sector, respectively, gross output TFP measures using equation (18), with adjustments for bias as 
indicated by equation (17) earlier above. 
 
relative goods and services productivity growth.  In Table VIII I combine the 60 sector US 
KLEMS and 29 sector EU KLEMS sectoral estimates of gross output private sector productivity 
growth into goods & services value added aggregates.  With an ξ of 0, i.e. no adjustment for Roy 
effects, the US and EU KLEMS data indicate that productivity growth is .8 % faster per annum in 
goods than services in the United States and 1.4 % faster per annum in the OECD 18 as a whole.  
Moving down, as ξ becomes more negative the gap between goods and services productivity 
growth narrows until, at a value of -.750, it disappears altogether in both samples.35  Aggregate 
productivity growth is relatively insensitive to ξ, i.e. there is not much aggregate bias, reflecting 
the fact that average wages per worker are relatively equal across the two sectors.36   
 In the US National Income and Product Accounts, between 1947 and 2011 the ln relative 
price of services to goods increases at an average annual rate of .0083, while the ln relative 
quantity increases by .0090.  According to the EU KLEMS data, between 1970 and 2005 the ln 
relative price of services to goods in the OECD 18 increases at an average annual rate of .0114, 
                                                 
35The Domar weighted sum of sectoral reallocations is larger in the OECD 18 than in the US alone, and 
hence eliminates a larger productivity gap with, interestingly,  the same value of ξ. 
36In the US KLEMS the ln average annual wage per hour is .059 higher in goods, with a time trend of          
-.0014 (.0005).  In the EU KLEMS, across 471 country x year observations ln relative goods wages are -.084 lower 
than in services and, with country dummies, show an annual trend of .0052 (.0004). 
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while the ln relative quantity rises by .0106.  Thus, the long run rate of increase of the relative 
price of services to goods is roughly equal to the long run rate of increase of their relative 
quantity.  Section II earlier showed that, under the assumptions of equal sectoral factor income 
shares and proportionate wages, assumptions which are tolerably satisfied in the data,37 the slope 
of the Roy supply curve equals -ΘLξ/(1+ΘLξ).  Setting ΘL equal to 2/3 and ξ to -.75, one gets a 
slope of 1.   As the Roy supply curve shows, there are bounds on the explanatory power of the 
Roy model.  If ξ is to lie within its theoretical limit of -1, there must be a sufficient movement of 
relative quantity and, more precisely, labour allocations relative to the observed sectoral relative 
price and (measured) productivity movements.  Both this simple back-of-the-envelope calculation 
and the more careful computations of Table VIII show that these movements exist. 
 The reported difference in goods and services productivity growth in the US and the 
OECD is .8 and 1.4 percent per annum, respectively.  Examining the values in Table VIII for ξ  
from -.5 to -1, the range of defense spending based long run elasticities found earlier, the adjusted 
difference ranges from +.5 percent in favour of goods to +.4 percent in favour of services.  Thus, 
while it provides indications that the productivity growth gap between the two sectors is grossly 
overstated, this paper does not have a definitive point estimate to deliver to the reader.  A value 
of ξ equal to -.75, however, lies in the middle of the point estimates, and allows for the 
reinterpretation of historical productivity, price and quantity data as representing a world in 
which true productivity growth in goods and services is roughly equal but Roy worker efficacy 
effects give rise to relative cost changes and the appearance of productivity growth differences.  
Thus, the "Roy supply curve" is a plausible, albeit not proven, explanation of the cost disease of 
services.  This is the main point of this paper.   
                                                 
37Relative wages are addressed in the preceding footnote.  Regarding factor shares, in the US KLEMS the 
average annual labour share in goods is .65, while in services it is .68, and their ln difference has an annual trend of       
-.0039 (.0005).   Across the EU KLEMS, the average annual labour share in goods is .68 and in services is .64 and 
the ln difference, with country dummies, has an annual trend of .0002 (.0003) 
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V.  Conclusion 
 William Baumol's cost disease of services has become part of the intellectual landscape of 
the profession, a truism taught, at least by this author, to generations of students.  The profession, 
however, is also mindful of the fact that total factor productivity growth is a residual, 
Abramovitz's (1956) famous "measure of our ignorance", and has constantly sought new ways of 
explaining it.  This paper follows a growing literature showing the role Roy's model of self-
selection amongst heterogeneous workers can play in explaining macroeconomic phenomena.  It 
finds evidence in the relation between employment shares and measured productivity that 
average worker efficacy declines as a sector's employment share increases, systematically biasing 
standard measures of productivity growth.  While there is considerable uncertainty about the 
precise magnitude of these effects, the depiction of the relative supply of goods and services as 
being based upon equal goods and services productivity growth, with a rising relative cost 
brought about by an association between average worker efficacy and sectoral employment 
shares, is a plausible alternative characterization of developments in the US and the OECD. 
 As noted by Jones (2002), barring the Great Depression and World War II, the growth of 
income per capita in the United States has been a remarkably steady 2% per annum for more than 
130 years, despite enormous structural changes in the US economy.  Theoretically, it is difficult 
to think about this historical record in a framework in which aggregate economic growth is 
asymptotically drawn down to that of the slowest, most stagnant, sector.  Practically, it is hard to 
sustain a fear of prospective stagnation in the face of such a lengthy retrospective history of 
constant growth.  The alternative view that, by and large, a rising tide of technology raises all 
boats (industries), while changes in relative prices simply reflect movements along a standard 
classroom concave production possibilities frontier, provides an easier way to think about the 
past history and future prospects of the US economy. 
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Appendix A:  Characteristics of the Model’s Equilibrium 
This appendix provides the mathematical details behind the assertions made in Section II. 
All of the proofs are couched in terms of a two sector economy (goods and services).  Their 
extension to the more complex N-sector case is straightforward. 
(a):  Regardless of the cumulative distribution function describing the paired draw (zG, zS), 
.1)/)(/( −>= iiii zdzd pipiξ  
Let Gj|i(y|z) describe the conditional probability zj < y given that zi = z, i.e. the cumulative 
distribution function of zj given zi, and let gj|i describe the corresponding conditional density and 
gi the marginal density of zi.  Then, with ω = wi /wj 
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where, in cases where the domains of gi and Gj|i do not include all positive real numbers I extend 
them, for the purpose of the integration, by defining gi and gj|i as equal to zero in the extended 
region (and similarly for other proofs below).  Note that gi(zi)gj|i(ωzi,|zi) = gi,j(zi,ωzi), the joint 
distribution of zi and zj at the point (zi,ωzi).   Assuming this joint distribution has mass along a 
positive measure of the ray with slope ω from the origin, we have dN/dω > 0 and dπi /dω > 0,38 
and it follows that 
                                                 
38If it does not, we are at a value of ω where neither πi nor iz  vary with ω, so the derivative of one with 
respect to the other is not well defined. 
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As noted in the text, this result is fairly obvious.   
For particular distributional forms, it is easy to calculate closed form solutions for ξ 
illustrating the properties imposed by different distributional assumptions.  Thus, for the case 
where the zi are independent draws from fréchet distributions with cumulative distribution 
functions Gi(zi) = exp(-(zi/λi)-θ), we have: 
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where I have used the substitution x = zi-θC in the second line.  Consequently:  
θpipiξ /1)/)(/()a5( −== iiii zdzd  
Thus, for independent draws from fréchet distributions ξ is a constant, a function of the 
distribution’s dispersion parameter.  
 It is not difficult to find distributions with different characteristics.  Thus, if zG and zS are 
independent draws from exponential distributions with densities λiexp[-ziλi], allowing 
ijji ww λλω /~ =  we have: 
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so ξ once varies between 0 and -1 as ω goes from 0 to ∞ or, equivalently, πi goes from 0 to 1.  In 
this case ξ is a function of sectoral size alone.  The log-normal distribution provides an interesting 
third example.  With independent productivity draws with ln means µi and (for simplicity) 
common standard deviation σ, we have (the proof involves the convolution and incomplete 
moment properties of the lognormal): 
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where N() is the cumulative standard normal and ω~  = ln(wi/wj)+µi-µj.  Holding constant the size 
of each sector (i.e. σω /~ ), as σ goes from 0 to ∞ ξ goes from 0 to -1 in both sectors. 
(b):  The bias in the growth accountant's measure of aggregate productivity growth for any 
distribution of paired draws (zG,zS). 
 Aggregate total factor productivity growth is the GDP share weighted sum of sectoral 
value added productivity growth 
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and where I have made use of (7) and (8) in the text for the second equality and simplified using 
the definitions of Ωi and ΘLi in the last equality.  Following the notation in (a) above for 
marginal, conditional and joint densities, with ω = wG/wS we have 
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where I have used the substitution zG = ω-1zS in the integral of the last line.  Using  
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we substitute into the last line of (b1) and get 
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which is equation (9) in the text. 
(c):  Equality of mean sectoral wages with different distributions.  
In the case of independent draws from fréchet distributions, equilibrium wages per worker 
equalize across sectors.  Using (a4) earlier:   
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which is independent of i.  This is not a general characteristic of this type of model.  For example, 
for the case where the productivities are independent draws from the exponential distribution, we 
use (a6) and see: 
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(d):  Independence of the paired productivity draws and η(z) = zg(z)/G(z), the elasticity of the 
distribution function generating the draws, declining in z are, together, sufficient 
conditions for 0/ <ii dzd pi  and ξ < 0, i.e. for average labour efficacy to be declining in a 
sector's share of total employment. 
 Equation (a1) above gives the formulas for iz and πi for a general joint distribution 
function gi,j(zi,zj) determining the paired productivity draws (zi,zj).  (a1) also notes that these are 
functions of the endogenous variable ω = wi/wj.  From this we see that: 
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where N(ω) is defined earlier in (a1).  As dN/dω divided by dπi/dω equals dN/dπi, which is the 
quality of the marginal worker, we see intuitively that the condition we are looking for is that the 
quality of the marginal worker entering the industry is less than that of the average worker.  
Substituting using the formulas in (a1) we have 
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and where I have redefined the terms in [] as the difference between the expectation of two 
random variables with cumulative density functions Fa(x) and Fb(x).  As is well known, if Fa(x) > 
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Fb(x) for all x, then E(a) < E(b).39   Note that Fa(x) is the same as Fb(x) except for the weighting 
function η.  If zi and zj are independent, then η becomes 
 )(
)()()d3(
zG
zzg
z
j
j
=η  
which is the elasticity of the distribution function.  If this is non-increasing in its argument, then 
Fa(x) > Fb(x) for all x40 and E(a) < E(b).  Strict inequality follows if η is strictly decreasing.41   
Note that this is a sufficient but not necessary condition, as E(a) < E(b) does not imply Fa(x) > 
Fb(x) for all x. 
 Figure A1 provides some intuition as to 
why independence alone is not sufficient to 
guarantee ξ < 0 and an additional condition on 
zg(z)/G(z), such as that specified above, is 
needed.  Individual talent is distributed across 
the (zi,zj) space depicted in the diagram.  The 
ray zj = wizi/wj determines the division between 
sectors, with workers with (zi,zj) draws above 
the ray working in industry j and those with 
draws below the ray working in sector i.  
Initially, workers below ray OAwork in 
industry i, but as wi/wj rises from ω0 to ω1  
workers in the region encompassed by the rays OA  and OB shift to the sector.  The average 
quality of pre-existing sector i workers depends on the zi weighted integral of the joint density in 
the area below OA  , while the quality of marginal workers depends upon the zi weighted integral 
of the joint density in the area between OA  and OB .  Even if zi and zj are independent, it is 
possible for the marginal worker to be of higher quality if the ratio [Gj(ω1zi)- Gj(ω0zi)]/ Gj(ω0zi) 
(the relative cumulative density for the zj draws) rises with zi in some regions, i.e. more relative 
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41Thus, for uniform distributions on [a,b], where η is a constant if a = 0, 0/ =ii dzd pi for some values of ω. 
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weight is placed on higher values of zi in the marginal worker integral.  Thinking of ω1/ω0 as the 
same relative change applied for each zi, avoiding this everywhere amounts to an elasticity 
restriction on Gj. The condition is sufficient, but not necessary, because it is possible for 
[Gj(ω1zi)- Gj(ω0zi)]/ Gj(ω0zi) to be rising in some areas and falling elsewhere and yet, depending 
upon the distribution of zi, for the average quality of the marginal worker to still be lower than 
that of pre-existing workers. 
 (e):  The range of prices supported by the supply curve in the standard Cobb-Douglas model 
with unequal sectoral factor intensities (footnote in the Introduction). 
 For  the standard Cobb-Douglas model with homogenous labour and production functions 
ii
iiii LKAQ αα −= 1 , the first order conditions for the optimal use of labour and capital imply: 
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The last equality simply notes that if the factor income shares are identical, the standard model 
yields a horizontal Baumol supply curve.   
Focusing on the first equality in (e3), we see that, holding constant the productivities Ai 
and Aj, the equilibrium variation in relative prices depends upon the equilibrium variation in w/r.  
The question is what range of variation in w/r is possible given constant total factor productivities 
and a constant endowment of capital and labour.  Let sector j be the sector with the higher capital 
intensity (αj > αi), and note that in equilibrium it must be the case that Kj/Lj > K/L > Ki/Li, i.e. the 
economy-wide capital-labour ratio must lie between the two sectoral capital-labour ratios.  From 
(e2) this implies 
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Since the economy-wide capital labour ratio is the weighted average of the sectoral capital labour 
ratios (with weights equal to their employment shares), as w/r moves to its lower bound the 
output of sector i goes to 0, while as it reaches its upper bound the output of sector j goes to zero.  
Consequently, as w/r moves from its lower to its upper bound the relative output Qi/Qj goes from 
0 to ∞.  This traces out the supply curve.  Combining (e3) and (e4) we see that the relative price 
change associated with this movement is: 
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In the BLS KLEMS 1987 to 2010 database the average annual capital income shares of value 
added for aggregate goods and services are αG = .35 and αS = .32, respectively.  Plugging these 
numbers into (e5), we get a variation in the ln relative price of goods to services from the bottom 
to the top of the supply curve of .03*ln(119/104) = .0040, i.e. 4/10ths of one percent.  For all 
intents and purposes, this is a horizontal supply curve. Thus, operating as if goods and services 
share the same factor income share provides a very close approximation to the actual relative 
supply curve generated by their differing factor intensities. 
 
Appendix B:  Labour Quality Measures for the BLS KLEMS 
 As noted in the text, the BLS KLEMS total factor productivity estimates do not 
differentiate by worker type.  For its aggregate private business and private non-farm business 
TFP measures, however, the BLS constructs measures of differentiated labour input using March 
Supplement Current Population Survey (CPS) data to construct measures of differentiated labour 
input and then adjusting the hours totals to match Current Employment Statistics (CES).  I use a 
similar methodology to construct differentiated labour measures for the 60 private sectors in the 
KLEMS and the government sector. 
 The first difficulty one encounters lies in matching the industrial sector definitions of the 
CPS and the KLEMS.  From 2003 to 2010, the CPS data uses aggregations of the categories in 
the 2002 NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), which are a close match to 
the NAICS categories used in the 60 sector KLEMS.  The only exceptions are NAICS 523 
(securities, commodity contracts and investments) and 525 (funds, trusts and other financial 
vehicles), which are separate in the KLEMS but combined in the CPS data.  I assume that the 
distribution of workers by type within the two sectors is the same as in the combined CPS sector.  
Pre-2003 data, however, are based upon the 1972, 1980 and 1987 SIC (Standard Industrial 
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Classification) codes.  While the differences between one SIC and another are minor, and easily 
reconciled by renumbering and combining a few detailed sub-categories, the differences between 
the SIC and the NAICS appear more substantial. 
 The BLS and I address the issue of changing sectoral definitions in labour statistics using 
2000-2002 CPS data.  In the 2000, 2001 and 2002 iterations of the CPS, industry and occupation 
data were collected using both the old and new classification systems.  In its published labour 
statistics, the BLS uses the cross-distribution of employment between old industry and new 
industry in the dual coded data to convert the old data series to the new industrial definitions 
(http://www.bls.gov/cps/constio198399.htm).  I follow a similar methodology, except that I use 
the cross distribution from old system industry x occupation categories to new industry.  
However, there are hundreds of industry and occupation categories, so not every industry x 
occupation cross-classification present in the 1987-2002 data appears in the 2000-2002 sample.  
For those missing observations, I use higher levels of aggregation, using first the old system 
industry x detailed (46 categories) occupation cross-classification, then the old system industry x 
major (14 categories) occupation cross-classification, and, when all else fails, for a handful of 
observations, simply the old system industry to new system industry distribution. 
 The second problem that arises is that of zeros.  I cross-classify workers by 61 sectors (60 
private plus public administration), 2 sexes, 6 age groups, 5 educational categories, and 24 
years.42  Given the limited samples in the CPS, this inevitably creates lots of zeros.  Zeros are a 
serious problem, as total factor productivity calculations involve calculating ln changes.  I 
address this issue by using iterative proportional fitting (Agresti 1990) to estimate the full five-
dimensional cross distribution using sub-dimensional totals.  Iterative proportional fitting fits a 
model that assumes independence at higher dimensions.  To illustrate with the three dimensional 
example where X is cross classified by i, j and k, one can use the observed Xij, Xjk, and Xik totals 
to produce estimates ijkXˆ  which are ln-linearly related to implicit interaction factors λij, λjk, and 
λik, with no interactions at the i x j x k level.  By using sub-dimensional totals to estimate the full 
array, one eliminates the zeros in the detailed cross-classifications.  For my estimates of wages 
per hour, where the samples are particularly sparse as the data are not available for all workers, I 
use all of the two dimensional cross-classifications to estimate the five dimensional array.  I 
calculate total hours and total income for each two-dimensional sub-array, iteratively 
proportional fit the entire five dimensional array, and then take ratios of cells to calculate wages 
                                                 
42The age categories are 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65+; the educational categories are less than 
high school, completed high school, some college, completed college, and more than college; the years are 1987-
2010. 
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per hour.  For my worker and hours data, the samples are larger.  I begin by defining 12 major 
sector aggregations (the principal sectors, with manufacturing sub-divided into durables and non-
durables) for the 61 detailed sectors.  I then iteratively proportionally fit the five dimensional 
array using every available three dimensional array based upon major industry classification and 
every two dimensional array based upon detailed industry classification.43  The use of major 
industry aggregations allows me to include interactions at higher dimensions without introducing 
zeros into cells, while the detailed industry two dimensional arrays retain the information on 
cross-distributions at that level. 
 To summarize my procedure, I begin by using the 2000-2002 CPS SIC industry x 
occupation to NAICS industry population distribution to convert 1987-2002 industry data to 2002 
NAICS definitions.  I then use the CPS March Supplement individual weights and aggregate to 
the 60 KLEMS sectors plus the government sector.  I treat as a "worker" anyone who reports 
more than zero hrs of work in the previous week.  I then adjust the population totals and hours of 
work totals by year x industry to match the BLS estimates of workers and hours by year x 
industry44 and iteratively proportionally fit workers and total hours to calculate workers and 
hours by industry x sex x age x education x year.  For wages per hour, I take all individuals for 
which the BLS is able to calculate a wage per hour (based upon the direct report or data on "usual 
hours"), aggregate into 61 sectors using the CPS weights, adjust hours totals by industry using the 
BLS CES data, and then iteratively proportionally fit total earnings and hours, taking the ratio of 
the two five dimensional arrays to calculate wages per hour.  The combination of hours and 
wages per hour then allow me to calculate sub-factor income shares by industry ( jLiΘ in the paper) 
and the data on hours per worker allow me to calculate Tornqvist measures of the growth of 
labour quality by sector which are comparable to those the BLS calculates for the aggregate 
private sector: 
 










 Θ+Θ
−










 Θ+Θ
−
−
−
−∑
1
1
1
1 ln
2
ln
2
)1B(
it
itLitLit
j
j
it
j
it
j
Lit
j
Lit
H
H
H
H
 
                                                 
43Thus, allowing D to denote detailed industry, M major industry, S sex, A age, E education and Y year, I 
use the sub-dimensional arrays DS, DA, DE, DY, MSA, MSE, MSY, MAE, MAY, MEY, SAE, SAY, SEY, and 
AEY.  In iterative proportional fitting, one can aggregate a dimension into sub-categories.  As long as that sub-
category contains additional cross-distributions, it is not redundant (i.e. MS is redundant given DS, but MSA is not) 
and provides an additional interaction factor. 
44The KLEMS TFP database only contains indices of hours.  I take levels of hours and workers from the 
Industry Employment and Hours Data Tables of the BLS labour productivity database.  These are not strictly 
consistent with the hours indices of the BLS KLEMS total factor productivity database.  However, I do not use these 
totals to change the measure of the growth of total labour input (hours) in the KLEMS database calculations, but only 
to calculate distributions of workers by characteristic, as shown shortly in (B1) and (B2).  
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where jitH  denotes total hours of worker type j in industry i at time t and itH  denotes total hours 
in sector i at time t.  The measures are added to the growth of labour input and subtracted from 
the growth of total factor productivity in the BLS data.  The data on the distribution of the 
population by worker characteristic then allow me to calculate weighted and unweighted 
Tornqvist measures of the changing shares of the labour force: 
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where jitpi  denotes the share of the aggregate working population of type j in industry i at time t 
and itpi  denotes the share of the aggregate working population in sector i at time t.  These 
measures are used as the instrumented dependent variable in Section III.  Since everything is 
benchmarked to the BLS totals, the itH and itpi  measures are simply the original BLS data and are 
consistent with the totals of jitH  and jitpi  across j.  The two measures in (B2) are different, but 
highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of .917. 
 
Appendix C:  Existing Micro-Data Estimates (McLaughlin & Bils 2001) 
 McLaughlin & Bils (2001, tables 4 and 5) using PSID data from 1979 to 1992 report that 
the average ln wage of industry leavers relative to stayers in industries with contracting 
employment shares and industry entrants relative to stayers (continuing workers) in industries 
with expanding employment shares is about -16 or -17 percent without adjustment for worker 
characteristics and -6 or -7 percent with adjustment for worker characteristics.  These estimates 
might lead one to conclude that comparative advantage is indeed aligned with absolute 
advantage, but that Roy worker efficacy effects are rather small.  In this appendix I show that the 
data examined by McLaughlin & Bils have little to do with the expansion and contraction of 
industries and are mostly related to a form of “churning” whereby workers simultaneously exit 
and enter industries. 
 I work with the annual 1971-199745 records of the PSID, using both the low income 
sample and the census based representative sample, focusing on the industry of employment of 
household heads.  I use two industrial classifications: (a) 9 aggregate sectors, a measure which 
should eliminate spurious industry shifts brought about by minor errors and misclassifications; 
(b) 24 sectors, which is the greatest detail I can achieve while keeping industry definitions  
                                                 
45Prior to 1971 industry is not reported; after 1997 the PSID moves to a biannual framework and hence the 
calculation of movers and stayers is not comparable.   
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Table C-1:  Entry, Exit and Sectoral Growth in the PSID (observations are industry x year) 
 Representative & Low Income Sample Representative Sample Alone 
 7 Private Sectors 22 Private Sectors 7 Private Sectors 22 Private Sectors 
 Rates ln Rates Rates ln Rates Rates ln Rates Rates ln Rates 
Correlation Between Entry and Exit Rates 
General 
(p-value) 
.675 
(.000) 
.717 
(.000) 
.842 
(.000) 
.759 
(.000) 
565 
(.000) 
.577 
(.000) 
.747 
(.000) 
.664 
(.000) 
Partial 
(p-value) 
.282 
(.000) 
.167 
(.025) 
.302 
(.000) 
.128 
(.002) 
.224 
(.002) 
.118 
(.114) 
.229 
(.000) 
.106 
(.012) 
N 182 181 572 571 182 180 572 564 
Regression on Change in Industry Employment Share (with industry & year dummies) 
En
tr
y ∆πit 
(s.e.) 
N 
.165 
(.099) 
182 
1.07 
(.506) 
182 
.217 
(.085) 
572 
1.11 
(.410) 
572 
.175 
(.132) 
182 
.828 
(.711) 
182 
.237 
(.111) 
572 
.751 
(.544) 
567 
Ex
it 
Ex
it ∆πit (s.e.) 
N 
.061 
(.099) 
182 
.094 
(.507) 
181 
.025 
(.081) 
572 
-.077 
(.415) 
571 
-.125 
(.125) 
182 
-.545 
(.706) 
181 
.017 
(.105) 
572 
-.245 
(.569) 
569 
   Notes:  N = number of industry x year observations.  An occasional observation is lost when taking the ln of a zero 
entry or exit rate.  Partial correlation = correlation of residuals from regression on industry and year dummies.  
Regressions = regression of entry or exit rates on industry & year dummies and the change in the share of non-
agricultural employment (∆πit). 
 
relatively consistent across the years, and is similar to the detail used by McLaughlin & Bils.46   
For a given industry i, examined in period t, workers are classified as stayers if they were in the 
same industry i in period t-1, entrants if they were in a different industry j in period t-1, and 
leavers if they worked in industry i in period t-1 but work in industry j in period t.  To be in the 
sample a worker needs to both report industry of employment and allow the calculation of ln 
wage per hour in consecutive years.  This eliminates unknown industry and workers who were 
completely out of employment in one year or the other.  Every worker who is an entrant in 
                                                 
469 sectors:  1 agriculture, forestry & fishing; 2 mining; 3 manufacturing; 4 construction; 5 transport, 
communications & utilities; 6 wholesale & retail trade; 7 finance, insurance and real estate; 8 other services (except 
gov't); and 9 government & armed forces.  24 sectors:  1 agriculture, forestry & fishing; 2 mining; 3 metal industries; 
4 machinery (inc. electrical); 5 motor vehicles & other transportation equipment; 6 food & kindred products (inc. 
tobacco); 7 textile mill products, apparel & other fabricated textile products, plus shoes; 8 paper & allied products; 9 
chemical & allied products, petroleum & coal products, and rubber & misc. plastic products; 10 printing & 
publishing; 11 other manufacturing; 12 construction; 13 transportation; 14 communication; 15 public utilities; 16 
wholesale trade; 17 retail trade; 18 finance, insurance and real estate; 19 business services; 20 personal services; 21 
health; 22 education; 23 other services (except gov’t); 24 government & armed forces. 
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industry i in period t is a leaver from some industry j in period t-1.  Although I use all 9 or 24 
sectors to categorize workers, I focus on entry/exit rates in the 7 or 22 private non-agricultural 
sectors.47  Overall I have about 61500 individual x year observations (a little over half in 
representative sample households) in these industries, with about 15% of these being entrants or 
leavers according to the broad sectoral definitions and 23% according to the narrow sectoral  
definitions.  
 I begin by reporting, in the top panel of Table C-1, the correlation between the sample 
fractions, at the industry x year level, of entrants (in entrants and stayers) and leavers (in leavers 
and stayers).  As shown, there is a very strong positive correlation between the fraction of the 
sample that enters an industry between period t-1 and t and the fraction that leaves the same 
industry between the same two periods.  This holds true whether the measures are in levels or in 
lns, using both the low income and representative sample or just the representative sample alone.  
The partial correlation of the entry and exit rates, after removing industry and year fixed effects, 
is weaker but still generally highly significant.  In contrast, in the bottom panel of the table I 
report the regression of the industry entry and exit rates on the change in the sector’s share of 
non-agricultural employment, with industry and year fixed effects.  As shown, the regression 
coefficients are almost universally insignificant, the only exception being entry rates for the 22 
industry measure, and this result largely disappears when the sample is restricted to PSID 
representative households alone. 
 Table C-2 follows the McLaughlin & Bils methodology, examining the average relative 
ln wages of different groups.  Without adjustment for worker characteristics, the wages of 
entrants or leavers are found to be between 11 and 19 percent lower than those of stayers (first 
four columns).  With adjustment for worker characteristics (last four columns), these mean 
differences are greatly reduced and, in many cases, rendered statistically insignificant.  Moreover, 
in all cases the vast majority of the estimates that underlie the calculation of these averages are 
insignificant.  Thus, for example, while the relative wages of entrants to stayers in expanding 
sectors are on average 3.1 percent (7 sectors) or 2.9 percent (22 sectors) lower among the 
representative PSID sample, only about 1/10th of the industry x year differences that underlie the 
calculation of these means are, by themselves, statistically significant at the 5% level.  Unlike 
McLaughlin & Bils, Table C-2 reports relative wages in both expanding and contracting sectors 
for all measures.  As shown, while the relative wages of entrants are lower than stayers in  
                                                 
47I relate these rates to the BLS Current Employment Statistics based historical SIC measures of 
employment, which exclude agriculture, while the focus on private sector activity is consistent with the measures 
examined earlier in the paper. 
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Table C-2:  Mean Wage Differences Between Industry Entrants or Leavers vs. Stayers in the PSID 
 Average ln Wages Differences Adjusted for Worker Characteristics 
 7 Private Sectors 22 Private Sectors 7 Private Sectors 22 Private Sectors 
 πit ↑ πit ↓ πit ↑ πit ↓ πit ↑ πit ↓ πit ↑ πit ↓ 
Entrants vs. Stayers (representative & low income PSID sample) 
Mean Dif. 
(s.e.) 
Significant/N 
-.141 
(.014) 
27/90 
-.189 
(.014) 
44/92 
-.128 
(.010) 
65/241 
-.161 
(.010) 
84/331 
-.031 
(.009) 
12/90 
-.065 
(.010) 
25/92 
-.033 
(.007) 
25/241 
-.050 
(.007) 
41/331 
Leavers vs. Stayers (representative & low income PSID sample) 
Mean Dif. 
(s.e.) 
Significant/N 
-.144 
(.014) 
25/92 
-.164 
(.015) 
32/89 
-.128 
(.011) 
53/243 
-.134 
(.010) 
68/328 
-.012 
(.010) 
7/92 
-.032 
(.011) 
6/89 
-.008 
(.008) 
21/243 
-.019 
(.007) 
12/328 
Entrants vs. Stayers (representative PSID sample) 
Mean Dif. 
(s.e.) 
Significant/N 
-.140 
(.019) 
18/90 
-.154 
(.019) 
34/91 
-.118 
(.014) 
34/241 
-.117 
(.014) 
59/326 
-.031 
(.012) 
10/90 
-.059 
(.014) 
20/91 
-.029 
(.009) 
22/241 
-.022 
(.010) 
35/326 
Leavers vs. Stayers (representative PSID sample) 
Mean Dif. 
(s.e.) 
Significant/N 
-.120 
(.019) 
11/92 
-.162 
(.019) 
28/89 
-.108 
(.015) 
29/242 
-.112 
(.014) 
50/327 
-.007 
(.014) 
7/92 
-.045 
(.013) 
9/89 
-.004 
(.010) 
21/242 
-.008 
(.011) 
28/327 
   Notes:  Observations are industry x year measures of wage differences.   Adjusted for Worker Characteristics = the 
coefficients on entrant (or leaver) yearly dummies in industry level regressions with controls for sex, age, age2, race 
(African-American), education (8 categories) and year (dummies), with random effects for PSID individuals.  πit ↑ 
(πit ↓): observations in industries whose share of total employment increased (decreased) in that year.  Mean Dif: 
mean year x industry difference for observations with πit ↑ or πit ↓; s.e. = standard error of the mean difference; N = 
number of industry x year observations; Significant = number of such observations which are, individually, 
significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
 
expanding industries, the difference is, generally, even larger in contracting industries.  
Similarly, while the relative wages of leavers are lower than stayers in contracting industries, the 
difference is generally almost as large in expanding industries.  These results completely 
undermine the interpretation of these wage differences as reflecting the relative efficacy of 
entrants in expanding industries and leavers in contracting industries. 
 In sum, changes of industrial sector in the PSID appear to reflect a form of “churning”, 
whereby both entry and exit simultaneously occur within industries.  It is not hard to motivate 
such movement, either with models of creative destruction within sectors or with a more general 
idiosyncratic destruction of existing jobs and appearance of new opportunities.  Workers with 
 63 
systematically lower human capital appear to play a disproportionate role in this churning, as 
adjustment for observable characteristics eliminates most of the relative wage differences.  While 
these facts are interesting in and of themselves, they provide little insight into the impact of the 
expansion or contraction of industry employment shares on average worker efficacy. 
